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DEFENSIVE WARFARE, PREVENTION AND HEGEMONY: 
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE  
FRANCO-SPANISH WAR OF 1635 
 
by Randall Lesaffer*




On 19 May 1635, a French herald formally declared war upon Spain at Brussels, the capital of 
the Spanish Netherlands. The ensuing war lasted 24 years and changed the balance of power in 
Europe, opening the way for France’s bid for European hegemony under Louis XIV in the 
second half of the 17th century. 
 In this article, the official justifications for war advanced by the two great belligerent 
powers are analyzed.  The paper uses the analysis of this material to establish contemporary 
understandings of what the law of nations said about the ius ad bellum (here meaning the body of 
law that regulates the right to wage war).  This sheds some light on the justice or legality of the 
two belligerents’ positions in terms of the then existing ius ad bellum, although no attempt is 
made to reach a conclusion on this.  
 In their official declarations and justifications of war, the two belligerents each 
distinguished between the legality (under the positive law of nations) and the justice (under 
natural law) of the war.  Each party provided succinct arguments under positive law against the 
disputed the legality of their opponent’s actions.  But their main emphasis was the justice of their 
own causes and war goals.  These arguments centered on their own interpretations of classical 
just war doctrine.  Whereas jurists and scholars in general tended to concentrate on just cause, 
the authors of the declarations and justifications of 1635 focused on the justice of their goals and 
the necessity of the war to attain these goals.  Thus they did not offer judgments on the offensive 
or defensive character of the war at the military-operational level, but rather at the political-
strategic level. This allowed both parties to characterize their resort to war as defensive.  Each 
justified the war as being necessary to defend its position as a great power and to uphold the 
ordering of Christian Europe.  Each thus identified the common interest of all princes and 
republics with either its own hegemonic position (in the case of Spain) or its supposedly rightful 
ambitions (in the case of France). 
 This Working Paper will be published as a two-part article in the Journal of the History 
of International Law (2006-07).   
                                                 
* The author (°Bruges, 1968) is Professor of Legal History at Tilburg University (The Netherlands) and teaches 
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I. SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1635 
 
 On Saturday May 19, 1635, around 9 o’clock a.m., Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, herald of 
France under the name of Alençon, carrying the insignia of his office, had himself announced by 
his trumpeter, Gratien Elissavide, at the Hallegate of Brussels in the Spanish Netherlands 
(roughly present-day Belgium).1 His assignment was as serious as it was to prove tedious. The 
King of France, Louis XIII (1610-1643), had issued orders for him to go to the Spanish 
Netherlands and present himself to Don Fernando of Spain (1609-1641), commonly known as 
the Cardinal-Infante, who ruled the Spanish Netherlands for his brother King Philip IV of Spain 
(1621-1665), and to declare war upon Spain. In case the Cardinal-Infante, who had received an 
ultimatum from the French King earlier2 and could not be mistaken about the reasons for the 
                                                 
1 On Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, see C.L. D’AUBAS DE GRATIOLLET, NOTES SUR LA FAMILLE D’AUBAS DE GRATIOLLET 
3-6 (1854). 
2 By the representative of the French king in Brussels, Gabriel d’Amontot, by order of the king of April 21, 1635. 
DENIS-LOUIS-MARTIAL AVENEL, LETTRES, INSTRUCTIONS DIPLOMATIQUES ET PAPIERS D’ETAT DU CARDINAL DE 
RICHELIEU vol. 4, 762 (Collection des documents inédits sur l’histoire de France No. 55, 1861). For the reply of the 
   
 
visit, refused to see the herald, Gratiollet was instructed to present the declaration to one of the 
courtiers of Don Fernando. If that did not work either, Gratiollet was instructed, as a last resort, 
to nail the declaration to a border post before reentering France.3
 This contingency plan would not prove superfluous. Some days later, in their report to the 
King, Gratiollet and Elissavide recounted their misadventures that day in Brussels. After the first 
commotion had subsided, the sergeant-major in charge of the Hallegate, together with the first 
king of arms of the Spanish Netherlands under the name of ‘Toison d’Or’, came out and invited 
the French herald into the town, relaying the promise that the Cardinal-Infante would grant him 
an audience. Thereby, under the customs and rules of chivalry and heraldry, his immunity as a 
herald was assured.4 The sergeant-major and the king of arms requested Gratiollet to lay down 
the symbols of his office, which he refused fearing this to be a ruse aimed at invalidating his 
future actions. Gratiollet was taken to the house of the sergeant-major at the Place de Sablon, 
where reassurance was given once again that the Cardinal-Infante would receive the herald later 
that day.5 At 2 o’clock p.m., the officer returned only to offer new excuses for more delay. 
During the day, several more officials came to see the French herald, among whom two other 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cardinal-Infante, see Letter of Richard-Pauli Stravius to Francesco Barberini of May 5, 1635, in CORRESPONDANCE 
DE RICHARD-PAULI STRAVIUS (1634-1642) 63 (Wilfrid Brulez ed., Analecta Vaticano-Belgica No. 2.10, 1955). 
3 Issued on May 12, 1635 at Saint-Quentin; published in AVENEL, supra note 2, vol. 4, 760. 
4 P. ADAM EVEN, Les fonctions militaires des hérauts d’armes¸ 71 ARCHIVES HERALDIQUES SUISSES 2 (1957). 
5 In reality, the Cardinal-Infante left Brussels after he had heard of the herald’s arrival and traveled to Leuven to 
prepare for the coming campaign; Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to Olivares of May 23, 1635: BRUSSELS, General 
Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 334, 239; MICHEL HUISMAN, JEAN DHONDT, AND LUCIENNE 
VAN MEERBEECK eds., LES RELATIONS MILITAIRES DES ANNEES 1634 ET 1635, REDIGEES PAR JEAN-ANTOINE 
VINCART, SECRETAIRE DES AVIS SECRETS DE GUERRE AU PAYS-BAS 124 (1958). 
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heralds from the Netherlands.6 Finally, between 6 and 7 o’clock p.m., Gratiollet offered the 
document of the declaration of war to one of the gentlemen of the Cardinal-Infante, who upon 
seeing it took flight. Gratiollet then left the house at the Sablon accompanied by two of the 
Cardinal-Infante’s heralds. After having mounted his horse, he threw the declaration of war on 
the ground among the angry crowd, while the heralds cried  not to touch the paper. Gratiollet and 
Elissavide then batted their retreat and rode back to France. When they reached the border in the 
morning of Monday May 21, the French herald attached two copies of the declaration to a post 
and informed the mayor of the nearby village thereof.7 The declaration read: 
 
 The herald of arms of France under the title of Alençon lets it be known to all concerned 
that he came to the Netherlands to find there the Cardinal-Infante of Spain on behalf of 
his master the King, his sole and sovereign Lord, to state that, as he [the Cardinal-Infante] 
has refused to restore the Archbishop of Trier, Elector of the Empire, to liberty, who has 
been placed under the King’s protection in the impossibility of the Emperor or any other 
prince to bestow their protection onto him, and as he holds a sovereign prince prisoner 
who was not at war with him, against the dignity of the Empire and against the law of 
                                                 
6 The heralds of Hainaut and Gueldres. 
7 Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas, Procez verbal du héraut envoyé par le Roy au Cardinal-Infante lui dénoncer la guerre, 72 
GAZETTE DE FRANCE 285 (1635); Jean Gratiollet d’Aubas and Gratien Elissavide, Relation au roi, in NOTES SUR LA 
FAMILLE D’AUBAS DE GRATIOLLET 14-8. See also Luc Duerlo, 1635: Hoe een oorlog begon, in TIENEN 1635: 
GESCHIEDENIS VAN EEN BRABANTSE STAD IN DE ZEVENTIENDE EEUW 111-13 (1985). 
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nations, His Majesty declares that he will get redress for this offense through the use of 
arms, as this is an offense against the interests of all princes of Christianity.8
 
 By the time Gratiollet had succeeded in delivering his message, the hostilities between 
the French and Spanish armies had begun. Even before Gratiollet and his trumpeter first entered 
the Spanish Netherlands, a French army of 26,000 men had crossed into the Duchy of 
Luxemburg, one of the Spanish fiefs in the Netherlands.9 On Sunday May 20, they met with a 
small Spanish corps under Prince Thomas of Savoy (1596-1656) near Les Avins and crushed 
it.10 Thus the war, that would last for almost a quarter of a century (up to 1659) and change the 
balance of power in Europe, started before it had been declared officially. 
 The medieval-style declaration of war to the Cardinal-Infante by herald was one of the 
last of its kind.11 By 1635, declaration by herald had fallen into disuse. As the sixteenth century 
moved on, wars were increasingly declared through an ambassador and announced to the world 
                                                 
8 Sommation envoyée de la part du Roy par un Héraut au Cardinal-Infante, 67 GAZETTE DE FRANCE 272 (1635); 
Gratiollet, supra note 7, at 288; D’Aubas and Elissavide, supra note 7, at 17 (my transl.). A copy of the declaration 
can be found in BRUSSELS, General Royal Archive, Papiers de l’Etat et de l’Audience No. 212. 
9 Letter of Hugo Grotius to the Rhinegrave Otto of May 17, 1635, in BRIEFWISSELING VAN HUGO GROTIUS vol. 5 at 
487-9 (B.L. Meulenbroek ed., 1966). 
10 RELATION DE CE QUI S’EST PASSE EN BATAILLE GAGNEE PAR L’ARMEE DU ROI CONTRE CELLE D’ESPAGNE, 
COMMANDEE PAR LE PRINCE THOMAS (1635). 
11 The last one was the Swedish declaration against Denmark in 1657; ERNEST NYS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET LES 
PRÉCURSEURS DE GROTIUS 111-12 (1882); TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT 
POLITICAL COMMUNITIES vol. 2, 59 (1863); VOLTAIRE’s claim that the 1635 declaration was the last of its kind 
remains, however, widely accepted in literature. Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV in ŒUVRES HISTORIQUES 632 
(René Pomeau ed., 1957). 
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through the publication of manifestos.12 More and more wars were not declared in any formal 
way.13
 The French declaration of May 19, 1635 served three purposes. First, France wanted to 
reassure its allies that France had finally broken with Spain. Second, by declaring war on Spain 
only, the French refrained from breaking with Spain’s main ally, the Habsburg Emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire. Third, by addressing the declaration not the Spanish King himself but to 
his representative in the Netherlands, France left the door ajar later to deny that it had declared 
war on Philip IV and Spain. Apart from the desire to prove chivalrous and the nice reminiscences 
it made to the days of the wars between the Emperor Charles V (1519-1558) and the French 
King Francis I (1515-1547), the desire to draw attention to this threefold message offers at least 
part of the explanation for the return to bygone formalities. 
 But France was not to retrace its steps and deny being at war with Spain. In the weeks 
following Gratiollet’s visit to Brussels, further steps were taken to make the state of war official. 
On June 6, 1635, Louis XIII issued a lengthy Declaration du Roy, announcing the state of war 
and offering abundant justification for it. It was duly registered by the Parliament of Paris on 
June 18 and subsequently published, on June 20, in the Gazette de France.14 Early July, another 
                                                 
12 Anuschka Tischer, Der Wander politischer Kommunikation im Kriegsfall: Formen, Inhalte und Funktionen von 
Kriegsbegründungen der Kaiser Maximilian I. und Karl V., 9 MILITÄR UND GESELLSCHAFT IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT 
7 (2005). 
13 ANDREAS STEINLEIN, DIE FORM DER KRIEGSERKLÄRUNG. EINE VÖLKERRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG 31-3 (1917); 
JOHANN WOLFGANG TEXTOR, SYNOPSIS IURIS GENTIUM 17.50 (John Pawley Bate transl., Carnegie 1916) (1680). 
14 DECLARATION DU ROY SUR L’OUVERTURE DE LA GUERRE CONTRE LE ROY D’ESPAGNE (1635). Also published in 85 
GAZETTE DE FRANCE 335 (1635).  
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text explaining the reasons for the war was released.15 While the first text was first and foremost, 
if not exclusively,16 directed at the King’s officials throughout the realm in order to inform them 
of the state of war and the measures against Spanish subjects and their property that went along 
with it, the second text was a manifesto addressed to the public at large. Although it was 
primarily aimed at a French audience, its readers could also include foreigners.17
                                                 
15 MANIFESTE DU ROY CONTENTANT LES JUSTES CAUSES QUE SA MAJESTE A EUËS DE DECLARER LA GUERRE AU ROY 
D’ESPAGNE (1635). It was published by Ribot (Paris), Roussin (Lyon), and Cramoisy (Paris). Also published in 20 
MERCURE FRANÇAIS 949 (1635). There are several translations in Spanish, e.g. MADRID, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 
2366, 204, Ms. 18192, 191, Ms. 10.713, and Ms. 18.195, 51, and in Italian, Ms. 11.000, 19 and Ms. 8.247. A 
transcription from Ms. 2366 was published in JOSÉ MARIA JOVER, 1635. HISTORIA DE UNA POLEMICA Y SEMBLANZA 
DE UNA GENERACION vol. 2, 469 (1949). The French King sent the text to one of his officials on June 9, 1635: 
LETTRE DU ROY ESCRITE A MONSEIGNEUR LE DUC DE MONBAZON, PAIR & GRAND VENEUR DE FRANCE, 
GOUVERNEUR & LIEUTENANT GENERAL POUR LE ROY, DE PARIS & ISLE DE FRANCE. CONTENANT LES JUSTES CAUSES 
QUE SA MAJESTE A EÜES DE DECLARER LA GUERRE AU ROY D’ESPAGNE (1635), also published in JEAN DU MONT, 
CORPS UNIVERSEL DIPLOMATIQUE DU DROIT DES GENS vol. 6-1, 105 (1726). There was also a Dutch translation 
published in 1635: MANIFESTE EN VERKLARINGE DES KONINGS VAN VRANCKRIJCK, GESCHREVEN AEN DEN 
HERTOGHE VAN MONT-BAZON … (1635). 
16 It certainly helped convince Hugo Grotius, then ambassador of the Swedish Queen in Paris, that the French were 
serious about their rupture with Spain. He wrote: ‘Het manifest bij den coninck wtgegeven ende het parlement 
geverifieert houde ik voor een volcommon rupture, soo veel die met woorden kan werden gedaen’ [The manifesto 
issued by the king and verified in Parliament constitutes, in my view, a perfect rupture, as far as this can be done by 
mere words] (my transl.); Letter of July 2, 1635 to Nicholas Reigersberch, supra note 9, vol. 6, 62-3 (1967). 
17 Hermann Weber, Zur Legitimation der französischen Kriegserklärung von 1635, 108 HISTORISCHES JAHRBUCH 
90, 104 (1988). 
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 On June 24, 1635, the Cardinal-Infante retaliated by having his own declaration issued.18 
In it, he offered his arguments for the justice of the Spanish cause. At the end of the text, the 
Cardinal-Infante, in the name of his brother, formally declared war upon France and listed the 
measures taken against French subjects and their property. As the French and their ally, the 
Dutch Republic, had incited the population of the Spanish Netherlands to revolt against the 
Spanish upon their joint invasion, the Cardinal-Infante’s declaration was primarily targeted at the 
citizens of the Spanish Netherlands.19 Moreover, the Cardinal-Infante’s declaration was spread 
throughout the Spanish empire, at least in official circles.20 In Madrid, Olivares had an extensive 
justification prepared to be issued by Philip IV. It dates, at the earliest, from the end of July 
1635.21 It was, however, never published. 
                                                 
18 DECLARATION DE SON ALTEZE TOUCHANT LA GUERRE CONTRE LA COURONNE DE FRANCE (1635). Published in the 
Plakkaten van Brabant on 24 June 1635, see HET TWEEDE DEEL VAN DE PLACCAETEN ENDE ORDONNANTIEN VANDE 
HERTOGHEN VAN BRABANDT PRINCEN VAN DESE NEDERLANDEN 354-6 (1635). 
19 A Dutch translation was soon made: VERKLARINGHE VAN SIJNE HOOGHEYDT AANGAENDE DEN OORLOGHE 
TEGHEN DE KROONE VAN VRANCKRYCK (1635). 
20 There were Spanish and Italian versions: DECLARACIÓN DE SU ALTEZA … DEL SEÑOR … CARDENAL-INFANTE 
ACERCA DE LA GUERRE CONTRA LA CORONA DE FRANCIA: MADRID, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 3-16.627 and 1.635. A 
Spanish version was also published by Martin Goblet from Madrid as DECLARACIÓN DE SU ALTEZA EL SERENISSIMO 
INFANTE CARDENAL TOCANTE À LA GUERRA CONTRA LA CORONA DE FRANCIA (1635). See also JOVER, supra 
note 15, vol. 1, 257-8. 
21 DECLARACION DE DON FELIPE CUARTO, REY DE LAS ESPAÑAS, AL ROMPIMIENTO DE LA GUERRA QUE SIN 
DENUNCIARLA HA HECHO LUYS, REY DE FRANCIA: MADRID, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 290, 103-41, partly published 
in JOVER, supra note 15, vol. 2, 505-11. In 1636, Emperor Ferdinand II (1619-1637) declared war on France too and 
followed it up by a manifesto as well. This is not considered in this article. It is published in VICTORINE HARTMANN, 
LES PAPIERS DE RICHELIEU, SECTION POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE, CORRESPONDANCE ET PAPIERS D’ETAT, EMPIRE 




II. DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND THE APPLICABLE LAW OF NATIONS 
 
 Whereas a declaration of war by herald had become extremely rare by the early 
seventeenth century and was hardly repeated after 1635, the official issuing of lengthy public 
declarations and manifestos offering justifications for the war was anything but rare. During the 
Early-Modern Age, almost all important wars were accompanied by a stream of such 
manifestos.22 Also, many scholarly treatises and manifestos, written by private persons, saw the 
light of day. Many of the authors of such treatises had close connections with their governments. 
This was certainly the case in 1635. In France, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands, several 
authors sat down at their desks to defend their sovereign’s cause and refute the enemy’s claims.23
 In this article, the legal justifications of the Franco-Spanish war of 1635 offered by the 
French and Spanish governments are analyzed. The discussion is limited to the four official 
declarations and manifestos mentioned above:  the two French, the one issued by the Cardinal-
Infante and the one prepared for Philip IV. 
                                                 
22 Konrad Repgen, Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa. Entwurf einer historischen Typologie, 241 HISTORISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT 27, 32 (1985). Anuschka Tischer (Marburg) is currently working on early-modern war declarations as a 
source for diplomatic history; see Anuschka Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen in der frühen Neuzeit – 
Funktionen, Formen, Inhalte, 8 MILITÄR UND GESELLSCHAFT IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT 48 (2004). 
23 For a survey and discussion of these private manifestos and treatises, see JOVER, supra note 15, and Tienen in de 
eindfase van de Tachtigjarige oorlog 1621-1648, in TIENEN 1635: GESCHIEDENIS VAN EEN BRABANTSE STAD IN DE 




 It cannot be the primary and sole purpose of analyzing these official statements to reach a 
verdict on the justice or legality of the two belligerents’ positions in terms of the then existing ius 
ad bellum, a term used here to denote the body of law that regulates the right to wage war. 
Rather, it is to try to establish what the law of nations said about the ius ad bellum at the time. 
After all, it is not so clear what the law of nations in general and the ius ad bellum in particular 
were in the early seventeenth century. Only when we have a clearer view on the ius ad bellum as 
it stood, we can reach a verdict on the rights and wrongs of the parties involved. 
 First, no codification of the relevant rules existed in whatever form. Second, the law of 
nations was in full transition. Since the early sixteenth century, Christian Europe had been in 
deep turmoil. The Reformation had shaken the very foundations of the medieval legal order of 
the Latin West, the respublica christiana. The religious wars between Catholic and Protestant 
powers, the internal strives in several countries such as the Holy Roman Empire and France, and 
the struggle for the hegemony over Europe between the French kings and the Habsburg rulers of 
Spain and the Empire had aggravated the crisis. The Age of Discoveries had opened up new 
worlds to the Latin-Christian West that were neither Latin nor Christian. This challenged the old 
political and juridical conceptions about the world and international relations. All this had caused 
the old legal order of the Latin West to crumble. And with it went the old law of nations, the 
medieval ius gentium.  
 Between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, many scholastic thinkers – theologians, 
Roman lawyers as well as canon lawyers – addressed questions relating to the law of nations (ius 
gentium). The medieval ius gentium was not an autonomous discipline; it was an inextricable 
part of theology and of the ius commune. The ius commune was the late-medieval legal doctrine 
that was common to the whole Latin West and that was based on the study and interpretation of 
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Roman and canon law. The scholastic theologians, and civil and canon lawyers also elaborated 
on the right to wage war. One of the products of their endeavors, especially of those of the 
theologians, was the doctrine of the just war.24 Founded upon authoritative texts such as the 
Bible, the Church Fathers, the Digest of Justinian, and the medieval collections of canon law, the 
ideas of the medieval theologians and lawyers on the ius gentium and on the right to wage war 
had authoritative value. And while there may have been as many opinions about a problem of the 
ius gentium as there were minds turned to it, a kind of simplified and vulgar communis opinio 
emerged that gained wide acceptance. At least those rules of the ius gentium that had a foothold 
in canon law could be upheld by the ecclesiastical courts, in particular by the highest of those, 
the papal court. The Christian faith, the canon law, and the authority of the Church formed the 
common basis for the ius gentium as a binding and enforceable law.25  
 The Reformation and the turmoil of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries changed 
all that. Religion, which had been a measure of unity, now became a measure of disruption. The 
canon law and the ecclesiastical courts lost their authority in the Protestant parts of Europe. As a 
                                                 
24 On the various contributions of theologians, and canon and civil lawyers to the question of the right to wage war, 
see PETER HAGGENMACHER, GROTIUS ET LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE JUSTE (1983). 
25 On the significance of canon law for the medieval ius gentium, see Dominique Bauer, The Importance of Medieval 
Canon Law and the Scholastic Tradition for the Emergence of the Early Modern International Legal Order, in 
PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR 
ONE 198 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004); Randall Lesaffer, The Medieval Canon Law of Contract and Early Modern 
Treaty Law, 2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (2000); idem, Argument from Roman Law in 
Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 25, 34-7 (2005); 
James Muldoon, The Contribution of the Medieval Canon Lawyers to the Formation of International Law, 28 
TRADITIO 483 (1972); idem, Medieval Canon Law and the Formation of International Law, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT DER 
SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, KAN. ABT. 64 (1995). 
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consequence, their usefulness for the relations between Catholic powers gradually eroded too. By 
the second half of the sixteenth century, the Pope and the ecclesiastical courts all but ceased to be 
appealed to as guarantors of peace treaties, something which had been a common practice before. 
As the canon law had formed the backbone of the authoritative doctrines pertaining to the ius 
gentium, these doctrines lost the strongest foundation of their authority. This does not imply that 
the old doctrines, such as the just war doctrine, were all of a sudden rejected. To the contrary, 
many writers, theologians as well as Roman lawyers, tried to save what they could, but opinions 
started to differ and new ideas took shape.26 By the early seventeenth century, many writers from 
different religions and intellectual backgrounds had amended the just war doctrine to allow the 
sovereign princes and republics of Europe more freedom of action. 
 The crisis of the Latin West and the Church’s loss of authority had made the sovereign 
princes and republics of Europe all of sudden truly external sovereigns, in the sense that they 
were free from any – even theoretical – higher authority in secular affairs. The medieval order of 
the respublica christiana, where all political entities stood in a hierarchical relation to one 
another and all had to recognize the ultimate if highly theoretical legal and political authority of 
the Emperor (until the thirteenth century), the Pope (until the sixteenth century), and their 
respective laws (Roman and canon law), had collapsed by about 1540-1550. The many 
international and internal wars of the period between 1540 and the Peace Treaties of Westphalia 
(1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), prevented the swift emerging of a new 
                                                 
26 As David Kennedy has indicated, the early-modern writers of international law (or primitive writers, in his 
terminology) continued to base their argument on the authority of the classical texts; David Kennedy, Primitive 
Legal Scholarship, 27 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 1, 5-6 (1986). But they did so with ever more flexibility in interpreting 
them, started to become critical about the authenticity of their sources (under the influence of humanism), and 
started to take into account in more explicit ways contemporary problems and ideas. 
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legal order and a new law of nations. In fact, this new order – the ‘Westphalian’ system of 
sovereign states – and its law – the modern law of nations or the ius publicum Europaeum – were 
only formed after Westphalia, sometime between 1660 and the Peace of Utrecht (1713). As such, 
the period between 1550 and 1660 was an age of transition from the medieval to the modern law 
of nations.27
 The years around 1600 saw an increasing interest in the law of nations. Writers such as 
Balthazar de Ayala (1548-1584), Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608), and, above all, the Dutch 
humanist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), laid the foundations for an autonomous literature and 
doctrine of the law of nations. They and their immediate successors emancipated the law of 
nations from theology and from the writings of the learned law at large, Roman and canon law. 
While their contribution was far from a creatio ex nihilo and while they adopted a lot of the 
medieval inheritance, new ideas and practices crept in. From 1600 onwards, writers would 
increasingly recognize that apart from the doctrinal traditions, they also had to take into account 
                                                 
27 I prefer the term modern law of nations to the more frequently used ‘classical’ law of nations for the law of 
nations of the era running from Westphalia to World War I, because it coincides with the meaning of ‘modern’ in 
the sense of general history, the ‘Modern Age.’ On the collapse of the medieval system, the period of transition, the 
significance of Westphalia and the formation of the modern law of nations after 1660, see Randall Lesaffer, The 
Grotian Tradition Revisited: Change and Continuity in the History of International Law, 73 BRITISH YEARBOOK 
INT’L L. 103 (2002); idem, Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia, in PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE 9 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004). On 
Westphalia and the formation of the modern law of nations, see STEPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN 




the practices of states and rulers, be they historical or contemporary.28 In doing so, they 
responded to the realities of their times. The collapse of the old system of the respublica 
christiana and the disappearance of a common, authoritative doctrine had thrown the sovereigns 
of Europe back on their own devices to find out what the law of nations was, or to create it 
themselves. Treaties and customs were becoming the primary sources of the law of nations. 
 This does not allow us to regard the doctrinal writings of the Early-Modern Age as 
trustworthy statements of the applicable law of nations. Under the medieval scholastic tradition, 
doctrine was authoritative and idealistic; it was the expression of an almost sacred ideal of what 
the law said or, better, ought to say. This conception of the role of the ‘learned law’ outlived the 
medieval tradition of the ius gentium. Ayala, Gentilis, and Grotius all incorporated references to 
state practice, without however leaving the traditional idealistic pretences of doctrine totally 
aside. 
 All this one needs to keep in mind when one addresses the question: What was the law of 
nations, or the ius ad bellum, in 1635? International legal historians, when faced with such a 
question, tend to refer to doctrine and limit their research to the writings of some of the famous 
‘classics of international law.’29 Doctrine is such convenient shorthand that any concern about its 
relation to the then applicable law is easily passed over.30 While this is a dangerous approach for 
                                                 
28 On this process of emancipation during the decades around 1600, see Randall Lesaffer, An Early Treatise on 
Peace Treaties: Petrus Gudelinus between Roman Law and Modern Practice, 23 J. LEGAL HISTORY 223, 224-5 
(2003). 
29 WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (2000). 
30 Or, at best, one tries to establish which doctrine was most influential in practice. For an example in relation to the 
ius ad bellum, see Partel Piirimäe, Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the 
Thirty Years War, 45 THE HISTORICAL JOURNAL 499 (2002).  
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all periods of history, this is particular irresponsible for the early seventeenth century. As stated 
above, the broad consent about the old doctrines had dissipated. The many publications on the 
law of nations that saw the light offer, more than anything else, an indication of the abundance 
and diversity of opinions that filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the old certainties. Many 
of these new publications combined old, if amended, doctrinal opinions with descriptions and 
analyses of state practice. As of 1635, there was no common opinion about almost any subject in 
the law of nations. No single work or author had such authority that his opinion can be equated 
with the then applicable law of nations.  
 This is as much true for Hugo Grotius and his De Jure Belli ac Pacis libri tres, first 
published in Paris in 1625, as it is for any other author. Grotius certainly was wellknown, and 
had become an authority in France and in some Protestant countries by 1635. His major treatise 
on the law of nations was already widely distributed over Europe by 1635.31 There can be no 
doubt that the drafters of the French declarations and manifestos knew Grotius’ book and have 
taken some of his ideas into account.32 Grotius had dedicated his book to the King of France and, 
                                                 
31 According to an often quoted story, the Swedish King Gustav Adolph (1611-1632) had Grotius’ treatise under his 
pillow during his campaigns in the Empire (1630-1632); J.L. DE BURIGNY, VIE DE GROTIUS, AVEC L’HISTOIRE DE 
SES OUVRAGES, ET DES NÉGOCIATIONS AUXQUELLES IL FUT EMPLOYÉ 135-6 (1752). By 1635, the treatise had been 
published, apart from the first edition from Paris of 1625 in Frankfurt (1626) and Amsterdam (1631 and 1632); 
JACOB TER MEULEN AND P.J.J. DIERMANSE, BIBLIOGRAPHIE DES ECRITS IMPRIMÉES DE HUGO GROTIUS 227-31 
(1950). 
32 Grotius was, however, not directly involved in the drafting of the Declaration. On July 2, 1635, in a letter to his 
brother Willem he wrote that he had seen the Declaration of June 6, implying that he had read it for the first time; 
supra note 9, vol. 6, 61. 
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as the Swedish ambassador in France,33 moved in French court circles at the time. But it is 
certainly not to be assumed that Spanish officials were aware of his work when drafting their 
declarations. In fact, to the Cardinal-Infante Grotius was as good as an unknown quantity in 
1635. In a letter to his brother Philip IV, dated May 15, 1635, Don Fernando passed on the news 
that Sweden had engaged as its new agent in Paris a certain ‘Huberto Groncio’ from Holland, of 
whom the Cardinal-Infante knew that he was a man of letters the Dutch detested because he had 
sided with Johan of Oldenbarneveldt.34
 In order to determine what the law of nations stated on a certain subject in the early 
seventeenth century in particular or in the Early-Modern Era in general, one should look both to 
state practice and to doctrine. For the ius ad bellum, apart from alliance treaties, official war 
declarations and manifestos are the most important and instructive sources. 
 This article proposes a case study of the public declarations and manifestos of one of the 
most important wars of the Early-Modern Age. The aim is to clarify what the ius ad bellum of 
the period was. This is not to say that the opinions and practices of two powers in one single case 
necessarily reflect the applicable law – even if it concerns the leading powers of the day. Even in 
a system where treaties and customary law are the dominant source of the law of nations, the 
actions of the greatest powers may as well constitute infringements of the law as they may 
                                                 
33 Grotius was officially accepted as Swedish ambassador to the King of France on March 2, 1635, supra note 9, vol. 
6, ix. On Grotius’ role as a diplomat, see C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth 
Century, in GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95, 121-31 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts eds., 1990). 
34 ‘ … de haver llegado a Paris de parte de la corona de Suecia embiado por Oxenstierna Huberto Groncio holandes 
y persona de buenas letras que desterraron por amigo de Bernavelt’ ; BRUSSELS, General Royal Archive, 
Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 212, 507. 
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constitute the law. This being said, explicit justifications of war as the ones we encounter here 
referred to a framework of opinions and rules in relation to which the actions of the belligerent 
were justified and of which the authors thought that they were commonly accepted. By 
consequence, justifications of war offer an indication of what powers considered (opinio juris 
sive necessitatis – to use a modern term) acceptable practice (usus) under the law of nations, in 
other words of what they considered to be customary law. 
 As a case study, the Franco-Spanish war has a lot to say for itself. First, it is one of the 
most important wars of the Early-Modern Age. Second, the belligerents went to great lengths in 
order to justify their actions. Third, the war is well documented. Many diplomatic sources have 
been published by modern scholarship. Even the declarations and manifestos have been studied 
by diplomatic and political historians. Their concern was, however, greatly different from the 
present one in that they were only looking to explain the political motives for the war whereas 
this article will be focussed on the legal aspects. But their work has laid the basis for a case study 
such as this. 
 At this point, it may be pertinent to warn against a misconstruction of historical reality 
that threatens from the study of current international law. It has been stated and repeated that the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928) and the UN Charter (1945) outlawed war and laid down a ius contra 
bellum.35 By opposition, the old ius ad bellum has often been perceived to be just that: an 
absolute right of sovereign states to wage war.36 Whereas this approaches reality for the 
nineteenth century, it becomes a distortion when it is applied to the previous three centuries. 
                                                 
35 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 78 (3rd edn, 2001); Michael Howard, Temperamenta 
Belli: Can War Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR 1, 11 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).  




During the Early-Modern Age, there were rules – either of positive or natural law – that laid 
down restrictive conditions for states to resort to warfare. Of course, there was no international 
institution to enforce these rules and sovereigns refused to attach legal consequences to 
statements about the legality or justice of war. War, as well as peace, became non-
discriminatory. Regardless of the justice or legality of a war, the laws of war were applied to all 
belligerents. In peace treaties, the signatories refrained from attributing blame for the war to one 
another. 37 This dominance of might over right was reflected in doctrine.38 But the rules on the 
justice and legality of war as such existed, both in doctrine and in international customary law. 
At least until the end of the eighteenth century, states went a long way in justifying their actions 
in terms of these rules, both in declarations of war and in alliance treaties.39 Their use and effects 
                                                 
37 In not one peace treaty between sovereigns of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, judgment was rendered on 
the legality or justice of war; JÖRG FISCH, KRIEG UND FRIEDEN IM FRIEDENSVERTRAG. EINE UNIVERSAL-
GESCHICHTLICHE STUDIE ÜBER GRUNDLAGEN UND FORMELEMENTE DES FRIEDENSSCHLUSSES 92-123 (1979); 
RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPA: EEN ZOEKTOCHT NAAR VREDE? (1453-1763/1945-1997) 248-57 and 470-5 (1999). 
38 The Swiss Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) is often quoted in this respect. But even he did not preclude the rendering 
of a judgment on war between sovereigns completely; EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI 
NATURELLE 3.3.40 (Charles G. Fenwick transl., Carnegie 1916) (1758). On the transition to a non-discriminatory 
concept of war, see FRITZ DICKMANN, FRIEDENSRECHT UND FRIEDENSSICHERUNG 127-9 (1971); Wilhelm G. Grewe, 
Was is klassisches, was ist modernes Völkerrecht?, in IDEE UND REALITÄT DES RECHTS IN DER ENTWICKLUNG DER 
INTERNATIONALER BEZIEHUNGEN. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG PREISER 119 (1983); Otto Kimminich, Das 
Problem des Friedenssicherung im Völkerrecht des 20. Jahrhunderts, in FRIEDEN UND VÖLKERRECHT 298 (G. Picht 
and I. Eisebart eds., 1973); CARL SCHMITT, DER NOMOS DER ERDE IM VÖLKERRECHT DER JUS PUBLICUM 
EUROPAEUM 25 (1950). 
39 In alliance treaties, planned or ongoing wars were almost always justified in terms of defense, with some 
notorious exceptions. LESAFFER, supra note 37, at 216-26 and 443-52. 
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were political and not legal, but their substance was at least partially legal.40 The texts of 1928 
and 1945 may be revolutionary, but they drew on a long tradition. Therefore, the study of the 
history of the modern ius ad bellum can still be of service for understanding where we stand 
today. 
 Before the texts of 1635 are studied, some preparatory work must be done. First, the 
political events leading up to the war of 1635 and the political motivations for that war are 
explained (Section 3). Second, the doctrine of the just war as it stood in the early seventeenth 
century is covered (Section 4). This will be of help in discerning the legal opinions underlying 
the declarations of war. Next, the four declarations and manifestos are analyzed (Section 5) and 
the ius ad bellum that underlay these texts is explained (Section 6). 
 
 
III. THE STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY IN EUROPE 
 
 The outbreak of the war between France and Spain in 1635 initiated the last phases of 
two other major wars: the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy Roman Empire (1618-1648) and the 
Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the rebellious Republic of the United Provinces in the 
Northern Netherlands (1568-1648, with the Twelve Years’ Truce between 1609 and 1621). The 
rupture with France dashed all hopes for a Habsburg victory in these wars and would ultimately 
lead to the compromise Peace Treaties of Westphalia between the Empire, Sweden, and France 
(24 October 1648) and the final recognition of the Republic by Spain at Münster (30 January 
1648). When the Franco-Spanish war began, Spain could still claim to be the leading power in 
                                                 
40 And partially moral.  
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Europe. When it ended with the Peace Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, Spain had lost that 
position. France was now well placed to make its bit for hegemony in Europe. The wars fought 
between 1618 and 1659 also marked the final stages of the crisis of the respublica christiana 
which had begun with the Reformation. The Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and the 
Pyrenees (1659) could not guarantee peace, but gave the great powers of Europe enough stability 
for a new international legal order to emerge in the decades to follow.41
 At the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War, Spain was still the leading power in Europe. 
The Spanish-Habsburg dynasty not only ruled Spain, Portugal, and the overseas territories of 
these kingdoms in America and Asia, but also Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, the Duchy of Milan, and 
the Spanish Netherlands, including the County of Burgundy to the east of France. Since the late 
1590s, Spain’s grand strategy had been basically defensive, at least in its own eyes. Its primary 
goal was to keep the empire intact and to withstand or prevent any attempt at dismemberment. 
Spain’s main concern was to defend the status quo and its existing hegemony, the Pax 
Hispanica. As the leading power of the day, Spain tended to identify the status quo and the order 
of Christian Europe, for which it considered itself the ultimate guarantor, with its own interest 
and vice versa. Any attempt against that order was likely to be perceived as a threat against 
Spain. 
 The dominant maxim of Spain’s foreign policy was that not a single right, not a single 
scrap of land could be given up. First, this would damage the reputation of the King. Second, this 
would trigger more aggression from Spain’s many enemies and lead to the collapse of Spain’s 
empire (the dominotheory). The two most strategic and threatened territories of Spain in Europe 
were the Duchy of Milan in Northern Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. Both were military and 
                                                 
41 1 Lesaffer, supra note 27, at 128.  
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logistic centers from which Spain could intervene in Northern and Central Europe, particularly in 
the Holy Roman Empire. The possession of these territories allowed to threaten Spain’s largest 
potential competitor, France. The weak link was the connection between Milan in Italy and the 
Netherlands: the Spanish Road. This land road through Germany was the lifeline of the Spanish 
empire. Its security was tightly interwoven with the peace and stability of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the security of the Catholic princes of the Empire through whose lands it ran. The 
security of the Spanish Road made it essential that the imperial crown was kept safely within the 
Viennese branch of the Habsburg-family and that the Austrian archdukes kept on to their 
hereditary lands, including their strategic territories in the Alps (Tirol) and the Alsace as well as 
the Kingdom of Bohemia, which guaranteed the narrow 4:3 Catholic majority among the electors 
of the Empire.42
 During the larger part of the reign of Philip III (1598-1621), Spain had adopted a 
defensive posture on the operational level and had sought to steer clear of major military 
adventures.43 The final years of Philip III’s reign saw a shift towards a more assertive foreign 
policy. In 1617, Philip III’s longtime favorite, the Duke of Lerma (1552-1624), fell from grace 
and was replaced by a more hawkish group led by Balthazar de Zuñiga (1561-1622). After the 
latter died in 1622, Gaspar de Guzman, Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645) and favorite of the 
new King Philip IV, quickly emerged as the new all-powerful valido. These new leaders 
promoted an interventionist policy in Europe, without changing the fundamentally defensive 
goals of Spain’s grand strategy. Zuñiga, Olivares, and their supporters felt that Lerma’s peaceful 
                                                 
42 GEOFFREY PARKER, THE ARMY OF FLANDERS AND THE SPANISH ROAD (1567-1659) (1972); IDEM, THE THIRTY 
YEARS’ WAR 34 (2nd edn, 1997). 
43 PAUL C. ALLEN, PHILIP III AND THE PAX HISPANICA, 1598-1621 (2000); BERNARDO JOSÉ GARCÍA GARCÍA, LA PAX 
HISPANICA. POLÍTICA EXTERIOR DEL DUQUE DE LERMA (1996). 
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policies had damaged the reputation of the Spanish monarchy and had jeopardized the position of 
Spain and the Casa de Austria, including the Habsburg dynasty that also ruled in Vienna and 
held the imperial crown.  
 When in 1617 trouble stirred up for the Viennese Habsburgs, Zuñiga and his allies in 
Madrid decided to act. The new leaders in Spain realized that the chances for an extension of the 
Twelve Years’ Truce with the Dutch after 1621 were slim and that war would soon resume in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, any attack on Habsburg interests in the Empire that could threaten the 
Spanish Road had to be withstood. In 1617, Madrid strengthened the ties with the Austrian 
Habsburgs and helped secure the imperial crown for the militantly Catholic Ferdinand II.44 
When the Bohemian rebellion broke loose and war between the Viennese Habsburgs and a 
coalition of Protestant powers erupted, Spain intervened. Whereas Spain’s hope was to quickly 
squash the rebellion and restore stability within the Empire so that it could divert its energies to 
the impending war against the Dutch Republic, the war escalated and became a swamp that 
would suck at Spain’s resources for the next thirty years. After the almost complete Habsburg-
Catholic victory in 1625, the Danish Lutheran King Christian IV (1588-1648) intervened. After 
Christian dropped out of the war (1629), his place was – far more successfully – taken by the 
Swedish Lutheran King Gustav Adolph (1630). 
 In 1621, war had resumed between Spain and the Republic of the United Provinces. 
Zuñiga and Olivares had no hope for a complete victory and the re-conquest of the rebellious 
provinces. Their goal was an advantageous and lasting peace that would provide for the free 
                                                 
44 ROBERT BIRELEY, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF THE CONTRAREFORMATION: EMPEROR FERDINAND II, 
W. LAMORMAINI AND THE FORMATION OF IMPERIAL POLICY (1981); IDEM, THE JESUITS AND THE THIRTY YEARS 
WAR: KINGS, COURT, AND CONFESSORS (2003). 
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practice of the Catholic faith in the Republic and stop the Dutch attacks on the Spanish and 
Portuguese interests in America and Asia, two demands that had not been met by the expiring 
Truce of 1609. Throughout the 1620s, Madrid’s hope was to beat the Dutch sufficiently to 
enforce such a peace upon them. But as it was felt that the road to military dominance went 
through Germany, Spain had itself increasingly been sucked into the German wars.45
 The coming to power of Armand du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu (1587-1642), as Prime 
Minister of France in 1624 marked the reemergence of that country as Spain’s main competitor. 
During the minority of Louis XIII (born 1601), France had been subjected to internal strife. In 
1615 an alliance with Spain was made, whereby both Louis XIII and the later Philip IV married 
princesses from the other house. In France, there was a strong faction, the dévots, that promoted 
the alliance with Catholic Spain and the internal and external fight against Protestantism over 
France’s own possible aspirations as a great power, which would pit it against Spain. 
 The first goal of Richelieu’s policy was to strengthen the authority of the King, and, 
through the King, of himself and his friends. He turned against the French Calvinists, the 
Huguenots, thereby keeping to his old, dévot policies. But he also proposed a more assertive 
foreign policy. From the very beginning of his time in office, Richelieu set France on a collision 
                                                 
45 On Zuñiga’s and Olivares’ strategy, see Peter J. Brightwell, The Spanish System and the Twelve Years’ Truce, 89 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 270 (1974); idem, The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years’ War, 9 EUROPEAN 
STUDIES REVIEW 409 (1979); idem, Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 12 EUROPEAN STUDIES REVIEW 
117 (1982); JOHN H. ELLIOTT, THE COUNT-DUKE OF OLIVARES: THE STATESMAN IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 55-84 
(1986); EBERHARD STRAUB, PAX ET IMPERIUM. SPANIENS KAMPF UM SEINEN FRIEDENSORDNUNG IN EUROPA 
ZWISCHEN 1617 UND 1635 11, 19-28 and 109-29 (1980). 
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course with Spain. He direly needed foreign policy successes in order to justify his strong-armed 
policies at home. But he also developed a very consistent foreign strategy for its own sake.46
 Richelieu did not perceive Spain’s strategy to be merely defensive. He argued that Spain 
sought the domination of the whole of Christianity: universal monarchy, or monarchia 
universalis.47 Spain’s current position was such that it threatened the liberty and sovereignty of 
all European princes, especially those of Germany and Italy. Furthermore, the territories of Spain 
and its Austrian allies encircled France and prevented it from intervening in Italy or Germany, 
since more than a century the battle grounds of Europe. Throughout his long term in office 
(1624-1642), Richelieu consistently defined France’s vital interests in the same terms: breaking 
the encirclement of France by the Habsburgs through gaining strategic footholds in Germany and 
Italy that allowed France better to defend itself, to intervene military in those countries and, in 
one and the same movement, to cut the Spanish Road if so wished.48 This did not translate in 
outright expansionism, but in a flexible policy that used various means – from pushing dynastic 
                                                 
46 David Parrott, The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635, in THE ORIGINS OF WAR IN EARLY MODERN 
EUROPE 72, 85-8 (Jeremy Black ed., 1987). 
47 Franz Bosbach, Die Habsburger und die Entstehung des Dreiβigjährigen Krieges. Die “Monarchia Universalis”, 
in KRIEG UND POLITIK 1618-1648. EUROPÄISCHE PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN 151 (Konrad Repgen ed., 1988). 
48 Richelieu himself consistently defined the French foreign policy and war aims as such. Compare his famous 
advice to King Louis XIII of January 13, 1629 in AVENEL, supra note 2, vol. 3, 179-213, with the Instruction pour 
Messieurs les Ambassadeurs des France, envoyéez à Cologne pour le Traitté de Paix générale (1637), in ACTA 
PACIS WESTPHALICAE SERIE I INSTRUKTIONEN 1 FRANKREICH, SCHWEDEN, KAISER 38-58 (Fritz Dickmann et al. 
eds., 1962) or Die Ausfertigung der Hauptinstruktion für Münster (1643), in IBIDEM 58-123. 
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claims over alliance treaties to war – in order to gain effective control – not necessarily involving 
sovereignty – over a few strategic fortresses at the Alpine passes and on the Rhine.49
 The first major clash between France and Spain came when the death of the last Duke 
from the house of Gonzaga, late 1627, triggered a succession crisis in Mantua. A French 
nobleman took power. Spain, however, could not condone that one of the most strategic 
fortresses of Northern Italy, Casale, would thus fall into the hands of a French ally and decided 
to act. Casale was besieged. In reaction, Louis XIII led an army into Italy (February 1629). In 
1630, the imperial army descended upon Mantua and gave Spain the military advantage. But in 
the summer of that same year, Ferdinand II turned the tables and opted for a compromise peace 
that left the Spanish empty-handed (Peace of Cherasco, 1631).50 Through silent and treacherous 
diplomatic maneuvering, France gained the fortress of Pinerolo from the Duke of Savoy and 
thereby secured itself a strategic entrance into Italy. 
                                                 
49 The traditional views on Richelieu’s dream of giving France natural borders (e.g. the Rhine) and therefore 
pursuing a blatantly expansionist policy is now far and wide rejected. On the old views, see P.E. Hübinger, Die 
Anfänge der französischen Rheinpolitik als historisches Problem, 171 HISTORISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 21 (1951). Good 
statements of the new assessment of Richelieu’s foreign policy can be found in, WILLIAM F. CHURCH, RICHELIEU 
AND REASON OF STATE (1972); JOHN H. ELLIOTT, RICHELIEU AND OLIVARES 86-172 (1984); Hermann Weber, 
Richelieu et le Rhin, 249 REVUE HISTORIQUE 265 (1968); IDEM, FRANKREICH, KURTRIER, DER RHEIN UND DAS 
REICH, 1623-1635 59-68 (1969). 
50 The first Peace Treaty of Regensburg of October 13, 1630 between the Emperor and France was subsequently 
rejected by Louis XIII and never ratified; D.P. O’Connell, A Cause Célèbre in the History of Treaty-Making: The 
Refusal to Ratify the Peace Treaty of Regensburg in 1630, 42 BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 71 (1967). See for these 
events, John H. Elliott, Spain and the War, in THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 92 (Geoffrey Parker, 1997); IDEM, supra 
note 45, at 337-346. TOBY OSBORNE, DYNASTY AND DIPLOMACY IN THE COURT OF SAVOY: POLITICAL CULTURE 
AND THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 143-192 (2002). 
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 The French-Spanish collision over Mantua did not lead to an all-out war yet. But it sent 
home the message to both Olivares and Richelieu that, in the long term, war was unavoidable. 
Richelieu wanted to postpone if not prevent such a war because he realized that France and his 
regime were not ready for it. But from 1630 onwards, Richelieu intensified his struggle against 
the Spanish monarchy by waging a true ‘war by proxy.’ This was done by giving diplomatic and 
financial support to all Spain’s enemies, including the Dutch, the Swedes, and the German 
Protestant princes. Richelieu also tried to stir up trouble for the Habsburgs by seeking favor with 
the princes of Italy and the members of the Catholic League within the Empire, chiefly among 
them the Elector of Bavaria Maximilian (1591-1651), all of them allies of the Emperor. Olivares 
rightly blamed France for much of the difficulties Spain met in Italy, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. As the years went by, he came to consider Richelieu’s France as the most important 
stumbling block for his main strategic goal: the restoration of the Pax Hispanica through a stable 
and advantageous peace in the Empire and, ultimately, in the Netherlands. Realization dawned 
upon the Count-Duke that sooner or later the Cardinal-Minister and his regime would have to be 
taken out of the equation. Maybe, the road to peace ran through Paris after all. While neither of 
both great statesmen had decided upon war by the early 1630s, both at least started to consider it 
in terms of contingency planning.51
 The early 1630s were overshadowed by the military successes of the Swedes in Germany. 
After his landing at Peenemünde in 1630, the Swedish King Gustav Adolph quickly scored some 
major victories. The lands of the main members of the Catholic League such as Mainz, Cologne, 
Trier, and Bavaria were occupied or threatened, while an army invaded Bohemia and struck at 
                                                 
51 ELLIOTT, supra note 45, 359-408. RICHARD A. STRADLING, EUROPE AND THE DECLINE OF SPAIN: A STUDY OF THE 
SPANISH SYSTEM, 1580-1720 103 (1981). 
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Vienna itself.52 The Habsburg position in North-West Europe also deteriorated as the Dutch, for 
the first time since 1621, had gone on the offensive in the war against Spain as of 1629.53
 Richelieu grabbed the opportunity to strengthen the French positions at the eastern 
borders. Once again, he tried to break the Catholic League loose from the Emperor and form a 
third, neutral party in the Empire. He used the leverage the Swedish threat gave him, offering the 
Catholic princes French protection against the Swedes in exchange for their neutrality. Of the 
more important princes, only the Archbishop-Elector of Trier, Philip von Sötern (1623-1652), 
accepted at first (April 9, 1632). He gave the French the right to garrison several strategic places 
in the Archbishopric such as Trier on the Moesel, Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine and Philippsburg, 
also situated on the Rhine in Sötern’s Bishopric of Speyer.54 In order to take the town of Trier, 
the French had to drive out the Spanish garrison that was there on the invitation of the burghers 
of the town, who had asked for protection against their own prince. Later, in September 1633, the 
Archbishop-Elector of Cologne followed suit and allowed French garrisons into his towns. 
Meanwhile, the French overran the Duchy of Lorraine and forced Duke Charles IV (1624-1675), 
an ally of the Emperor, to cede his lands temporarily and to allow them to be garrisoned by the 
                                                 
52 RONALD G. ASCH, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPE, 1618-1648 101-7 (1997); 
GEORGES PAGÈS, LA GUERRE DE TRENTE ANS 1618-1648 117-50 (1972); 2 PARKER, supra note 42, 108-19; MICHAEL 
ROBERTS, GUSTAVUS-ADOLPHUS: A HISTORY OF SWEDEN, 1611-1632 vol. 2 (1958); C.V. WEGDWOOD, THE THIRTY 
YEARS WAR 269-334 (1938). 
53 DAVID PARROTT, RICHELIEU’S ARMY: WAR, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN FRANCE, 1624-1642 101-2 (2001). 
54 Treaty of Ehrenbreitstein of April 9, 1632, in DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 29. The Swedes, however, had 
already taken Philippsburg and only gave it up at the end of 1634. 
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French (1631-1634). Louis XIII and Richelieu also gained some places in Alsace along the 
Upper-Rhine.55
 By the winter of 1632-1633, Spain and its allies were in dire straits. The war in the 
Netherlands had turned disastrous. The towns of ‘s Hertogenbosch (1629) and Maastricht (1632) 
had been lost while rebellion threatened in the Spanish Netherlands (1632-1633). Richelieu’s 
‘war by proxy’ seemed on the verge of success. At that point, Olivares decided to mobilize all 
the energies of the monarchy to mount a new offensive against Spain’s enemies. The cornerstone 
of this endeavor was the decision to send King Philip’s youngest brother, the Cardinal-Infante, 
with an army through the Empire to open up the Spanish Road, take over the government of the 
Spanish Netherlands, and reinvigorate the Spanish military operations in the North. On his way 
through the Empire, on September 6, 1634, the Cardinal-Infante scored a major victory together 
with his brother in law, the Emperor’s son Ferdinand (later Ferdinand III, 1637-1657) against the 
Swedish army at Nördlingen. Instead of capitalizing upon that victory and further push back the 
Swedes, Don Fernando continued his journey to the Spanish Netherlands, where he arrived in 
November 1634.56
 In recent years, historians have quarreled about the question whether Madrid had by that 
time decided upon a war against France and was planning to invade France in 1634 or 1635. 
Richard Stradling has argued that an offensive against France was surely in the making. In his 
                                                 
55 Louis Batifol, Richelieu et la question d’Alsace, 138 REVUE HISTORIQUE 161 (1921); BERTOLD BAUSTAEDT, 
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DREIßIGJÄHRIGEN KRIEGES vol. 1, 203-374; Georges Fagniez, Le Père Joseph et Richelieu, 36-8 REVUE HISTORIQUE 
(1888-1890); WILHELM MOMMSEN, RICHELIEU, ELSAß UND LOTHRINGEN (1922); WEBER, supra note 49, 108-321. 
56 ALFRED VAN DER ESSEN, LE CARDINAL-INFANT ET LA POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE DE L’ESPAGNE 1609-1641 (1944). 
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view, Spain only did not start the war of 1635 itself because France forestalled it. Indeed, in 1634 
and 1635 plans to invade France circulated and naval preparations were made. In its session of 
April 13, 1634 the Council of State in Madrid had decided that time was not yet ripe for a 
declaration of war against France and that it was better to let events unfold themselves.57 At the 
meetings of the Council of State of January 14 and 16, 1635 and of March 3, 1635, however, 
Olivares was clearly entertaining thoughts about a rupture with France and discussed the 
preparation for an invasion of France.58 In April 1635, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, 
Cristobal de Benavente, was recalled.59 In 1636, after the Cardinal-Infante had repulsed the 
Franco-Dutch invasion of 1635, he invaded France. Also, after the Battle of Nördlingen, the 
Spanish intensified their attempts to secure an offensive and defensive alliance with Vienna 
against the Republic and France.60 Stradling also implied that Olivares had planned an offensive 
war against France ever since the Mantuan debacle and gave it strategic priority over an 
offensive against the Dutch.61 Though Stradling shrinks from taking this final step, from there to 
the claim that Spain after all wanted to strengthen its hand in a great-power war that would give 
it monarchia universalis would be a small step. Jonathan Israel took offense at Stradling’s 
                                                 
57 ELLIOTT, supra note 45, at 472; PARROTT, supra note 53, at 106. 
58 SIMANCAS, General Archive, Estado No. 2049 and No. 2050, 3 and 32. See Richard A. Stradling, Olivares and 
the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War of 1627-1635, 101 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 68, 90-3 (1986). 
59 Stradling, supra note 58, at 93. 
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analysis. He defends the view that Spain, even after the opening of the hostilities with France, 
kept granting an offensive against the Republic priority and opted for a defensive military 
posture against France, at least in the Netherlands. The invasion of France by the Cardinal-
Infante of 1636 was a one-time event, an opportunistic move that was only decided upon after 
the planned attack on the Republic was aborted for that year and ultimately triggered by the 
possibilities it gave for joint action with the imperial army.62  
 These opposing views are less irreconcilable than they seem. In general, politicians’ 
actions are less consistent than scholars’ generalizations need them to be. The truth of the matter 
is that Stradling concentrates on the decision-making in Madrid, while Israel also takes into 
account the position of the Cardinal-Infante and his advisers in Brussels. Behind all this lurks a 
discrepancy between the level of strategic planning on a European scale and the level of 
operational planning for the distinct military theaters. Stradling is right in as far as he claims that 
Olivares thought a war against France to be probable if not unavoidable ever since the Mantuan 
crisis and that he incorporated this possibility into his plans. During 1634, he also made plans for 
an offensive against France.63 He seemed to be convinced by then that it would be necessary to 
take France out of the equation to make victory against the Dutch possible. A quick and 
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devastating attack on France followed by a peace treaty would accomplish this.64 On the level of 
the Spanish strategy war planning, France came to the fore as a main concern of Olivares as the 
1630s progressed. But that does not mean that the same was true on the level of the operational 
planning for the Netherlands. Nor does it imply that, even on a European scale, the plan for an 
attack against France was prepared concretely and seriously enough or had sufficiently 
progressed by the winter of 1634-1635 for the invasion to materialize any time soon.65 The 
evidence Israel brought in is quite convincing to the point that, on the operational level of the 
Netherlands, Olivares did not give priority to an attack against France over the operations against 
the Republic.66 But the Count-Duke was not consistent in this either. Olivares was opportunistic 
and volatile in his decisions at the operational level. When the Spanish scored a major, 
unexpected success against the Republic with the capture of the fortress of Schenk at the end of 
1635, his hopes for a successful offensive against the Republic for 1636 soared. Once the fortress 
was recaptured in the early days of the 1636 campaigning season and the Cardinal-Infante 
decided to invade France in concordance with the imperial army, Olivares agreed. The Cardinal-
Infante, as Israel indicated, showed a similar flexibility, but was more driven by the realities on 
the ground than the armchair military planner Olivares.67 Finally, Israel is right to stress the 
continuity in Olivares’ main strategic goal: an advantageous peace with the Republic. War and a 
subsequent peace with France were a means to that end, and not the other way around.  
                                                 
64 This view is shared by ELLIOTT, supra note 45, at 457-519. 
65 During the meeting of the Spanish Council of State of March 5, 1635, at which Olivares talked about war with 
France, he also proposed military actions against Maastricht, Grave, or Venlo in the Northern Netherlands. 
SIMANCAS, General Archive, Estado No. 2050, 32. 
66 Israel, supra note 62, at 272-80. 
67 ELLIOTT, supra note 45, at 492-5 and 504-5. 
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 In short, Israel is right that the war with France did not change Olivares’ main goal – 
securing peace with the Hague – and did not dominate the operational planning and decision-
making for the Netherlands. Stradling for his part is right that during the years 1634 and 1635 
Olivares took into account the possibility of an attack on France and even had plans drawn up. 
But they were not pursued sufficiently for them to materialize in time and no actual decision to 
attack France was made. 
 The crucial question for our purposes, viz. whether Spain would have invaded France if 
France had not moved first, cannot be answered with certainty. But to indulge for a brief moment 
in the conjectures of counter-factual history, my hunch is that Spain would in any case have 
made its decision to declare war and start an offensive against France dependent upon the 
Emperor and would thus have waited one or more years.68 The Cardinal-Infante for his part did 
not plan an invasion of France in 1635. Before the French invasion of May of that year, Don 
Fernando had only issued orders for his troops to march towards Trier to prevent the French from 
joining up with the Dutch.69 But whatever the answer to this question might be and however 
offensive the actions of Olivares might have become, the goal of Spain’s grand strategy had not 
changed. Spain did not aspire to any French territory nor did it seriously expect to reconquer the 
                                                 
68 For the circumstantial evidence for this, see Lesaffer, supra note 59, 333-51 and footnotes there; also RANDALL 
LESAFFER, DEFENSOR PACIS HISPANICAE. DE KARDINAAL-INFANT, DE ZUIDELIJKE NEDERLANDEN EN DE EUROPESE 
POLITIEK VAN SPANJE: VAN NÖRDLINGEN TOT BREDA (1634-1637) 87-116 and 141-63 (1994). See also RENÉ 
VERMEIR, IN STAAT VAN OORLOG. FILIPS IV EN DE ZUIDELIJKE NEDERLANDEN, 1629-1648, 126-7 (2001). 
69 Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV of May 15, 1635, in CORRESPONDANCE DE LA COUR D’ESPAGNE SUR 




Northern Netherlands. As ever, the Spanish war aims were peace and the restoration of the status 
quo ante, in other words, of its hegemony, the Pax Hispanica. 
 The French decision to declare war upon Spain and invade the Spanish Netherlands in 
May 1635 is easier to understand. The victory of the two Habsburg princes at Nördlingen 
changed the balance of power in the German theater. All of a sudden, Richelieu had reason to 
fear that his greatest nightmare would become true: that his allies would make their peace with 
the Emperor and Spain and that France would be left alone to face the wrath of the Casa de 
Austria. For years, France’s Protestant allies had implored Paris to break openly with the 
Spanish. France had always evaded this. Even in 1634, when news reached Paris of an offensive 
alliance between Spain and Louis XIII’s rebellious brother and heir, Duke Gaston of Orléans 
(1608-1660),70 did Richelieu still resist the pressure for an open war.71  
 After Nördlingen, this was no longer a possibility. In November 1634, the Lutheran 
Elector of Saxony signed a preliminary peace agreement with the Emperor. The Republic and 
Sweden increased the pressure on France to enter the war. As the imperial armies rolled back the 
Swedish and approached the French positions on the Rhine, the fear for a Habsburg invasion 
grew.72 Whereas Richelieu still stalled on a final decision in his negotiations with the Swedish, 
                                                 
70 Treaty of Brussels of May 12, 1634. 
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he concluded an offensive league with the Republic on February 8, 1635.73 Thereby the parties 
agreed that they would jointly invade the Spanish Netherlands that year. The allies agreed to call 
upon the population to rise against the Spanish and liberate themselves. If this transpired, then 
the Spanish Netherlands would become a sovereign and Catholic federation. If not, then their 
lands would be carved up by France and the Republic.74 Nevertheless, the Treaty included an 
escape clause. The Preamble made the Treaty conditional upon the fact that the Spanish would 
continue to refuse a reasonable accommodation.75 Richelieu also sent diplomats to Italy in order 
to form an offensive alliance against Spain with as many Italian states as possible and start a war 
there. This met with partial success.76 To ward off disaster on the eastern borders of France, in 
late 1634 the French had sent an army into the Lower Palatinate and thus became involved in the 
war in the Empire against the Emperor – though a state of war was not openly recognized.77
 Meanwhile, the Habsburgs continued to strengthen their positions in the West of the 
Empire. On January 24, 1635, imperial troops captured the fortress of Philippsburg. On February 
2, they drove the French garrisons out of the Bishopric Speyer. Two months later, on March 26, 
1635, the Spanish, knowing of the French-Dutch invasion plans, took an ominous step. On that 
                                                 
73 A year before, Richelieu had still refused Dutch proposals for an offensive alliance; Fagniez, supra note 55, vol. 
2, 206-7; ISRAEL, supra note 62, at 303-4; PARROTT, supra note 53, at 106. 
74 Treaty published in DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 80. See JEAN DE PANGE, CHARNACE ET L’ALLIANCE 
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75 ‘… if the Spanish do not accept reasonable terms for an accommodation,’ Preamble (my transl.), in DU MONT, 
supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 80. 
76 BAUSTAEDT, supra note 55, 132-3; AUGUSTE LEMAN, URBAIN VIII ET LA RIVALITE DE LA FRANCE AVEC LA 
MAISON D’AUTRICHE DE 1631 A 1635 462-5 (1949); Weber, supra note 71, at 210. 
77 PARROTT, supra note 53, at 108. 
 33 
 
day, a Spanish corps took the town of Trier by surprise, thereby killing some two hundred French 
soldiers and capturing another six hundred. They also secured the Archbishop-Elector Philip von 
Sötern and abducted him to the Spanish Netherlands.78 Louis XIII and Richelieu now decided to 
act and declare war.79 On April 21, 1635, the French resident diplomat Gabriel d’Amontot was 
instructed to demand the release of the Elector from the Cardinal-Infante and threaten with 
war.80 A week later, Louis XIII and Richelieu hastily secured their alliance with the Swedish at 
Compiègne.81 Meanwhile, the Spanish ambassador in France left Paris quietly.82 After the 
Cardinal-Infante’s reply of May 4, 1635 had reached them,83 Louis XIII and Richelieu instructed 
Jean Gratiollet to go and declare war, invoking the capture of Trier and its sovereign as the casus 
belli. 
 An eventual final decision by Olivares to invade was forestalled by France’s action. 
Richelieu took that action, although he was even less assured of success and the readiness of his 
country than Olivares already wasn’t. But the Battle of Nördlingen had turned France’s war by 
proxy on itself, and after the Cardinal-Infante’s bold move against Trier, Richelieu must have felt 
that he was running out of options. Turning down his main protégé in this hour of need was 
                                                 
78 Letter of Richard Pauli Stravius to Cardinal Francesco Barberini of March 31, 1635, supra note 2, at 56-7; 
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simply not one of the few remaining options if further defections from the anti-Habsburg alliance 
were to be prevented. But all the preparations, plans, and diplomatic maneuvers of the winter of 
1634-1635 did not impede the protagonists to continue to search each other out for peace until 
the last moment.84 For a long time, war had been expected, prepared, and even planned for; but 
above all, it had been dreaded. 
 
 
IV. JUST AND LEGITIMATE WARS IN EARLY-MODERN DOCTRINE 
 
The medieval just war doctrine 
 
 To the Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas (1224/1225-1274) falls the merit of 
having laid down the classical formula of the just war doctrine. According to Aquinas, for a war 
to be just three conditions had to be fulfilled. First, a war had to be waged under the authority of 
a prince (auctoritas principis). War was distinct from acts of violence between private persons, 
who had to seek redress for injuries suffered through the courts of their prince. The same went 
for subordinate rulers and bodies politic. By the days of Aquinas, it had become widely 
established that war was the privilege of those princes who did not recognize a higher authority 
(superiorem non recognoscens) – apart from the higher authority of the Pope and maybe the 
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Emperor, that is.85 Second, a war had to be waged for a just cause (causa iusta). Aquinas 
indicated the avenging or punishing of a wrong suffered at the hands of the enemy and the 
restoring of what had been unjustly seized as the main causes of war. More generally, under 
medieval doctrine, war was just if it was a reaction to a wrong suffered at the hands of an enemy, 
whether it was defensive or offensive on an operational level. It served as an instrument of law 
enforcement, as a substitute for judicial trial, as a kind of trial by battle. By and large medieval 
doctrine did not touch much upon the issue of self-defense as a just cause for war because it was 
considered the exercise of a natural right of each man, and not only of princes. Moreover, to 
many theologians, it was considered somewhat morally deficient as it was self-serving. Finally, 
doctrine also distinguished actions in the exercise of the natural right of self-defense from actual 
war. Actions in self-defense did not trigger the full application of the iura belli – the rights of 
war – such as the right to make booty and conquests. The natural right of self-defense was also 
limited in that resort to force had to stop once the attack was warded off. An actual war, could go 
on, however, after the attack was stopped in order to inflict punishment on the enemy.86 Third, 
the belligerent needed to be of a righteous intention (recta intentio). This referred to his moral 
disposition. The goal of the war had to be something morally good, such as the establishing of a 
firm and just peace.  
 To many of the scholastic scholars of the Late Middle Ages, a war could only be just on 
one side. As the justice of the cause and the righteousness of the intention of the belligerent 
could be held to the light of a common and authoritative body of law (the ius commune of 
                                                 
85 Other scholars, like Cardinal Hostiensis (ca. 1200-1270), stuck to the view that only the supreme sovereigns, the 
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Roman and canon law) and morality (Christian moral theology), the truth about the claims of the 
belligerents could be established objectively. Doing this was the realm of the ecclesiastical courts 
and, above all, the Pope. According to Roman lawyers, only the belligerents that were waging a 
war in accordance with the ius ad bellum enjoyed the benefits of the application of the ius in 
bello, the laws regulating the conduct of war, such as the right to appropriate the lands and 
property of the enemy.87 Several civilians, among whom the great commentator Bartolus of 
Saxoferrato (1314-1357), however, mitigated the consequences of this discriminatory concept of 
war. For a belligerent to qualify as a hostis whose right to wage war was recognized and thus to 
enjoy the iura belli,  it sufficed that he was sovereign and that war had been formally declared. 
As there was no higher authority to judge on the claims of superiorem non recognoscentes, each 
had to judge the justice of his claims for himself.88
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Neo-scholasticism and humanism 
 
 To the early-modern writers of the law of nations, the just war was of great concern.89 
The collapse of the medieval order and the erosion of the authority of the papal courts and the 
medieval theological and juridical doctrines jeopardized the traditional conceptions. What 
Bartolus had already touched upon now became a problem of insurmountable proportions. In the 
absence of any higher or neutral authority to rule on the justice and morality of a belligerent’s 
claims and intentions and of any common moral and legal framework, how could the justice of 
this or that belligerent be established? And if both parties stuck to their positions and stated to be 
the sole just belligerent and thus the sole to benefit from the ius in bello, how could the 
application of that ius in bello be guaranteed? The issue was also itensified by the problems 
raised in relation to the non-Christian and non-Roman peoples of the New World. How could the 
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old, medieval rules based on Roman and canon law as well as Christian theology be applied to 
those peoples? 90
 Modern scholarship has classified the forefathers of the modern law of nations of the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, sometimes referred to as the ‘precursors of Grotius,’91 
in two broad categories: the neo-scholastic writers such as the Spanish theologians of the School 
of Salamanca, who continued the tradition of medieval, scholastic theology, and the writers who 
were, to a greater or a lesser extent, influenced by humanism.92 Whereas most international legal 
historians have stressed the novel contributions of the authors of both schools to the just war 
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state sovereignty and the interests of the state – reason of state – as the guiding principle of international relations 
and its law. I count Balthazar de Ayala and Albericus Gentilis belonging to this group. 1 Lesaffer, supra note 27, 
121-2 (2002). On the contribution of some ‘pure’ humanists, see José Antonio Fernandez-Santamaria, Erasmus on 
the Just War, 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 209 (1973); IDEM, THE STATE, WAR AND PEACE: SPANISH 
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE RENAISSANCE, 1516-1559 (1977). 
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doctrine, one has to keep in mind that their writings, including those of Grotius, stood in a 
dialectic relation to the traditions of the past. Confronted with the collapse of the old and with the 
challenge of new realities, they fought a downhill battle, but one in retreat. But apart from some 
exceptions – e.g. Ayala – and whatever the outcome, their endeavors were inspired by the desire 
to save what they could from the old doctrines by adapting them to the new realities. 
 
 
Francisco de Vitoria 
 
 First among the neo-scholastic thinkers of the period was the Dominican Francisco de 
Vitoria (ca. 1480-1546). Vitoria’s first concern was the justice of the Spanish conquest of the 
Indian lands in the Americas.93 Vitoria restated Aquinas’ doctrine of the just war, but also 
                                                 
93 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE IURE BELLI, Introduction, English translation in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 295 (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). For a recent edition of the Latin text 
(with German translation), see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, VORLESUNGEN II. VÖLKERRECHT, POLITIK, KIRCHE 542 
(Ulrich Horst, Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and Joachim Stüben eds., Kohlhammer 1997). On Vitoria’s doctrine, see 
Camillo Barcia Trelles, Francisco de Vitoria et l’école moderne du droit international, 17 RECUEIL DES COURS 111, 
242-333 (1927); FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA, supra note 92, at 131-41; JÖRG FISCH, DIE EUROPÄISCHE EXPANSION 
UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT. DIE AUSEINANDERSETZUNGEN UM DEN STATUS DER ÜBERSEEISCHEN GEBIETE VOM 15. 
JAHRHUNDERT BIS ZUR GEGENWART 212-23 (1984); GREWE, supra note 29, at 204-7; ALEJANDRO HERRERO Y 
RUBIO, DERECHO DE GENTES. INTRODUCCIÓN HISTORICA 43-63 (1995); Kennedy, supra note 26, at 32-5; HEINZ 
KIPP, MODERNE PROBLEME DES KRIEGSRECHT IN DER SPÄTSCHOLASTIK. EINE RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIE ÜBER 
DIE VORAUSSETZUNGEN DES RECHTES ZUM KRIEGE BEI VITORIA AND SUAREZ (1935); JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE 
SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS 195-241 (1934); 
Antonio Truyol y Serra, La conception de la paix chez Vitoria et les classiques espagnols du droit des gens, 15 
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nuanced it to such an extent that much of it became irrelevant. Whereas, objectively speaking, a 
war could only be just on one side, Vitoria acquiesced to the fact that war could be just on both 
sides from a subjective point of view. A sovereign prince who on the basis of an ‘invincible 
ignorance’ was convinced of the justice of his cause and acted in good faith, could be excused 
from the guilt of waging an unjust war. A war between two sovereigns who were convinced of 
their cause, was to be considered a war between two just belligerents.94  
 As for the causes of a just war, Vitoria clinched to Aquinas’ view that war was only 
justified as a reaction against a wrong suffered.95 Among the just causes, Vitoria named war on 
account of tyrannical oppression of subjects by their own ‘barbarian masters’ and war in the 
defense of the innocent victims of two particular sins against nature: human sacrifice and 
cannibalism.96 A right of intervention existed to protect those who had converted to Christianity 
and were afterwards forced to forswear their new faith.97 Vitoria’s ideas about the just war on 
                                                                                                                                                             
RECUEIL DE LA SOCIETE JEAN BODIN POUR L’HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS 241(1961); Joe 
Verhoeven, Vitoria ou la matrice du droit international, in ACTUALITE DE LA PENSEE JURIDIQUE DE FRANCISCO DE 
VITORIA 97, 112-17 (1988); Ziegler, supra note 90, at 5-15. 
94 VITORIA, supra note 93, 2.4.32. 
95 VITORIA, supra note 93, 1.3.13. Vitoria also considered self-defense a natural right belonging to each individual. 
He defined it as a ‘response to immediate danger, made in the heat of the moment’. It did not include punitive action 
after the attack had ceased, as a just war did, 1.2.4-5. 
96 VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS 3.15, English Translation in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS 233, 287-
8 (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991). For a recent edition of the Latin text (with German 
translation), see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, VORLESUNGEN II. VÖLKERRECHT, POLITIK, KIRCHE 370 (Ulrich Horst, 
Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and Joachim Stüben eds., 1997). 
97 VITORIA, supra note 93, 3.13. On the ideas of Vitoria, as well as Ayala, Gentilis, and Grotius about intervention, 
see G.P. van Nifterik, Religious and Humanitarian Intervention in Sixteenth- and Early Seventeenth-Century Legal 
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both sides were adapted by most of the later Spanish neo-scholastics.98 They offered a way out 
of the dilemma caused by the collapse of the old authorities without having to abandon the 
general outlines of traditional doctrine. But for all practical purposes, they went a long way 
towards reducing the old doctrine to its first condition: a war waged by a sovereign who took the 
trouble of justifying his actions through a plausible claim had to be considered a just one. 
 
 
Balthazar de Ayala 
 
 On the Spanish side, Balthazar de Ayala (1548-1584) has to be mentioned, especially 
since he lived and worked in the Spanish Netherlands. His notoriety was not limited to the 
Spanish world; Grotius himself referred to him.99 Ayala studied law at the Leuven law faculty. 
As an auditor in the Spanish army in the Netherlands, he was above all a practitioner and a 
pragmatist. Among the authors discussed, his ideas were the least influenced by traditional 
doctrine and were the most innovative. For Ayala, war was the privilege of sovereigns. And 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thought, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (16TH-18TH CENTURIES) (Randall Lesaffer and Georges 
Macours eds., forthcoming 2006). 
98 GREWE, supra note 29, at 206. The Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), another leading representative of the 
Spanish neo-scholastics, rejected the notion of a war that is just on both sides. But he went to great lengths to 
attribute the benefits of the ius in bello to the soldiers fighting on the ‘wrong’ side; Kennedy, supra note 26, at 54-6; 
LUCIANO PEREÑA VICENTE, TEORIA DELLA GUERRA EN FRANCISCO SUAREZ vol. 1, 119-315 (1954); JOSEF SODER, 
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99 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI III, PROLEGOMENA 38 (Francis W. Kelsey transl., Carnegie 1925) 




because they were sovereigns, nobody could judge on the justice of their actions. Ayala 
enumerated the just causes of war, but he attached no legal consequences to such matters.100 
They belonged solely to the domain of moral justice – that is, binding on someone’s conscience 
–, but not of ‘complete’ – that is, externally binding – law. Ayala was the first author of the 
Early-Modern Age to distinguish between the justice and the legality of war. For a war to be 
legal and the laws of war to apply, it sufficed that it was, first, waged by a sovereign and, second, 
formally declared.101 If these conditions were fulfilled, it was legal and the laws of war 
applied.102 By consequence, all wars formally declared between sovereigns were lawful on all 
sides.103 One of Ayala’s main concerns was to reject the legitimacy of the Dutch rebellion 
against the Spanish monarchy. Because rebels were no sovereigns and because rebellion itself 
was unlawful, a rebellion could never be considered a war and rebels could hold no claim to be 
treated as hostes and enjoy the benefits of the ius in bello. They had to be treated on a par with 
                                                 
100 He enumerated the defense of oneself, one’s allies, and property, the revindication of property and the avenging 
of a wrong; BALTHASAR DE AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI LIBRI III 1.2.11 (John 
Pawley Bate transl., Carnegie 1912) (1582). On Ayala, see Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Baltasar de Ayala, 1 REVISTA 
ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 125 (1948); GREWE, supra note 29, at 207-9; W.S.M. Knight, Balthasar 
Ayala and His Work, 3RD  SERIES 3 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (1921); 
JAIME PERALTA, BALTHASAR DE AYALA Y EL DERECHO DE LA GUERRA (1964); HANS-JÜRGEN WOLFF, 
KRIEGERKLÄRUNG UND KRIEGSZUSTAND NACH KLASSISCHEM VÖLKERRECHT MIT EINEM BEITRAG ZU DEN GRÜNDEN 
FÜR EINE GLEICHBEHANDLUNG KRIEGFÜHRENDER 181-8 (1990). 
101 AYALA, supra note 100, 1.2.34. Ayala referred extensively to the procedure of declaring war by the Roman 
fetials according to Livy; AYALA, supra note 100, 1.1; LIVY 1.32.6. 
102 MERON, supra note 87, at 42-3. 
103 AYALA, supra note 100, 1.2.34-5. 
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pirates and robbers.104 More generally, Ayala rejected any form of intervention by a ruler on 
behalf of another ruler’s subjects. In the Christian world, it fell to the Pope to act against a 





 On the Protestant side, Albericus Gentilis (1552-1608) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
were the two foremost authors. It is certain that Grotius’ work was known in French government 
circles by 1635, and Grotius acknowledged his indebtedness to Gentilis.106
 Gentilis was a Protestant of Italian origin who had fled his homeland and had found a 
new home in England. He became Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford (1587). He was 
definitely influenced by humanism.107 Like his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, 
Gentilis paid lip service to the traditional just war doctrine, but adapted it to the realities of his 
day.108 According to the Italian jurist, all defensive wars waged by sovereigns were just, whether 
                                                 
104 AYALA, supra note 100, 1.2.12-15. 
105 AYALA, supra note 100, 1.2.27. 
106 GROTIUS, supra note 99, Prolegomena 38. 
107 TUCK, supra note 92, at 16-50. 
108 ALBERICUS GENTILIS, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 1. 2-3, 5, 7 and 12 (John Rolfe transl., Carnegie 1933) (This is 
the 1612 edition. The work was first published in separate parts during the years 1588-1589, and then again in one 
volume in 1598). On Gentilis, see Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. 
Holland’s Inaugural Lecture, in GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 133 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, 
and Adam Roberts eds., 1990); idem, Il diritto della guerra et della pace di Gentili. Considerazioni sparse di un 
Groziano, in IL DIRITTO DELLA GUERRA E DELLA PACE DI ALBERICO GENTILI. ATTO DEL CONVEGNO QUARTA 
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fought in defense of themselves, their subjects, or allies and friends.109 Among offensive wars, 
he made a distinction between wars avenging a wrong and wars waged to enforce a juridical 
claim. Not only did he follow Vitoria to the point that a war could be just on both sides 
subjectively speaking, but he also found that it could be just on both sides objectively speaking. 
In the absence of a higher judicial authority, sovereigns enjoyed a legal right to wage war in 
order to enforce a disputed claim, even if this claim proved to be unjust. In this sense, a war over 
the enforcement of a disputed claim had to be likened to a civil trial. As in a civil trial procedural 
law granted both parties the right to bring their case to court, so the law of nations granted all 
sovereigns the right to fight over their claims. Gentilis acknowledged that nothing guaranteed the 
victory of the party who had the stronger claim, but that could not be helped.110 For the state of 
war to be legal and the ius in bello to apply, a formal declaration of war was necessary, except in 
cases of self-defense against an ongoing attack. In Gentilis’ view, the declaration served as an 
ultimate attempt to prevent war. The party who declared war had to observe a period of thirty-
three days between the rendering of the declaration and the opening of the hostilities.111  
 Furthermore, Gentilis made some interesting points concerning defensive warfare on 
behalf of others. Referring to the great Stoic tradition of Cicero and Seneca, which had been 
                                                                                                                                                             
GIORNATA GENTILIANA 21 SETTEMBRE 1991 7 (1995); Thomas Erskine Holland, Alberico Gentili, in IDEM, STUDIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1898); Kennedy, supra note 26, at 65-74; Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in 
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violence); GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.13. 
110 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.6. 
111 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 2.1.217-8 and 2.2.218-9. 
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revived by the humanists, Gentilis recognized that all mankind was bound together through 
‘kinship, love, kindness and a bond of fellowship.’112 From this, he derived a moral obligation to 
render aid to other peoples, if one could do so without prejudice to oneself. This obligation was 
not limited to princes and peoples with whom one had a treaty of alliance, but extended to 
peoples of the same ‘race and blood,’ and certainly the same religion.113  
 Contrary to Ayala, Gentilis held the opinion that if a rebellion was sufficiently 
widespread, it could be considered a war. The rebels took on the characteristics of a public body 
politic and thus gained the right to wage war.114 If the rebels had a just cause, their war was a 
just war. Such belligerents could then be lawfully assisted by other princes against their own 
(former) sovereigns. More generally, princes had the right to intervene to protect foreign subjects 
if those were treated unjustly by their sovereigns.115 This allowed one, under certain 
circumstances, even to assist rebels in a cause that was not just.  
 Gentilis touched upon the question of preventive defense. Whereas self-defense properly 
speaking was referred to as ‘necessary defence’ (necessaria defensio), this was referred to as 
‘defence by expediency’ (utilis defensio). Gentilis allowed for anticipatory defense, which he 
defined as making ‘war through fear that we may ourselves be attacked’.116 By this he meant 
anticipatory action against dangers ‘that are already meditated and prepared,’ or what we could 
almost compare to our current notion of preemptive defense. ‘Preventive action,’ to use present-
                                                 
112 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.15.107 (transl. vol. 2, 67). 
113 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.15.116-17. 
114 He supported the English intervention of 1585 on behalf of the Dutch Republic; GENTILIS, supra note 108, 
1.16.127. 
115 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.16.120-2. 
116 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.14.96 (transl. vol. 2, 61). 
 46
 
day terminology, against ‘probable and possible dangers’ was also justifiable. He explicitly 
referred to the danger that Europe would fall under the domination of Spain. But the danger of a 
state becoming too powerful, a ‘probable and possible danger,’ made a war not just by itself. 
Only if another just cause could be invoked, would war be just.117 Finally, as regards offensive 
war, Gentilis allowed for interventions in order to punish those who committed grave violations 
of the laws of nature and of mankind such as cannibalism or atheism. He vested this right in the 





 The strength of Grotius’ seminal De jure belli ac pacis of 1625 does not lie in its clarity 
or consistency. Its merit is that it offers the most comprehensive synthesis of the law of nations 
of the early seventeenth century. As such, it became a work of reference for generations to come. 
But Grotius’ work was eclectic as it drew from various intellectual backgrounds, including neo-
scholasticism and humanism.119 Although Grotius may have been an innovative author on some 
points, whose ideas have withstood the test of times and certainly helped form the modern law of 
nations, he did not radically break with the old, medieval intellectual traditions. This and the 
tendency of the humanist erudite to quote extensively from an abundance of historical and 
                                                 
117 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.14.104-7; Tuck did not mention this last nuance in his exposition on Gentilis and 
preventive war, TUCK, supra note 92, 18-31. 
118 GENTILIS, supra note 108, 1.25. 
119 Since the late nineteenth century, Grotius’ dependency on the neo-scholastic writers has been stressed. More 
recently, Tuck rightly vindicated the humanist influence on Grotius’ work; TUCK, supra note 92, 78-9. 
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literary sources make up for the fact that Grotius’ thought is often unclear, unsystematic, and, at 
times, paradoxical or outright contradictory. After all, it is these paradoxes and contradictions 
that allow scholars to grant Grotius at one and the same time both the title of father of the 
modern law of nations, based upon an almost absolute concept of state sovereignty,120 and of the 
‘post-modern’ international law of the twentieth century, which sought to limit that same 
sovereignty.121
 Like his ‘precursors’, Grotius sought to reconcile tradition with the new reality of the 
emerging sovereign state and the collapse of the old caused by religious warfare and the 
discovery of a new world. The elasticity of his thought was facilitated by his distinguishing two 
kinds of law of nations: the natural law of nations (ius gentium naturale or primarium), which 
was derived from natural law, and the volitional law of nations (ius gentium voluntarium or 
secundarium), which was man made and found its basis in human will.122 The latter category 
                                                 
120 For the discussion about Grotius’s ‘fatherhood’ of the modern law of nations, see Maurice Bourquin, Grotius est-
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bodies of law had to say; Lauterpacht, supra note 121, at 5. This is actually true for many humanist writers who 
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was, of course, to be found in treaties and customs, but it could also be based on the general 
consent of the peoples. The natural law of nations was binding in foro interno, upon conscience, 
and the voluntary law of nations was binding in foro externo¸ in the external legal order. To 
Grotius and his predecessors, the binding on the conscience meant more than the cynical 
international lawyers of the twenty-first century are likely to think. Natural law was still the law 
that mattered. Natural justice and morality remained closely associated to religion, which 
continued to weigh heavily on the decisions of princes, to the extent that it constituted one of the 
major issues in international relations. Moreover, throughout the early seventeenth century, 
princes often made the most important decisions after consulting their confessors or a council of 
theologians.123 The ultimate basis for the binding character of the volitional law of nations was 
the natural law principle of pacta sunt servanda.124 In Grotius’ view, the volitional law of 
nations could never contradict natural law. Its purpose was only to clarify or specify natural law. 
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KRAUS 227 (1954). 
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After all, the binding force of the volitional law rested upon the law of nature and its inherent 
justice and rationality.125
 In his De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius developed two doctrines on war, without clearly and 
consistently separating and distinguishing them: one pertaining to the domain of natural law and 
one pertaining to volitional law.126 In the realm of natural law, the Dutch humanist abided by the 
Thomist tradition of the just war. The just causes for war were the traditional ones: defense, 
including that of subjects, allies, and friends, revindication of property, and punishment of a 
wrong suffered.127 In more general terms, Grotius stated that war could only be undertaken ‘for 
the enforcement of rights.’128 War was thus rejected as an instrument for change. Grotius 
adopted Vitoria’s views on invincible ignorance and the war being just on both sides.129 Wars 
fought for a just cause were just if they were fought for one’s own sake or for the sake of 
another. The defense of subjects, allies, friends, and all people with whom one had a bond of 
kinship was as laudable, if not more, than self-defense.130  
                                                 
125 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 82-3. 
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 Grotius’ ideas about the justice of intervention were inspired by those of Gentilis and, to 
a lesser extent, Vitoria. He discussed the problem in terms of natural, and not volitional law. 
Much like Vitoria and Gentilis, Grotius indicated the sovereign rulers of the world as the 
defenders and upholders of natural rights, be it for their own or for foreign subjects.131 He 
accepted the right of intervention to punish acts against the law of nature and to protect innocent 
people from those acts. Among other things, he expressly referred to acts of cruelty committed 
against Christians because of their religion.132
 In line with medieval doctrine and his immediate predecessors, Grotius considered self-
defense, whether against a just or an unjust attack, a natural right. It pertained to both individuals 
and states, whereas war did only to the latter. The use of force by private persons Grotius 
referred to as private wars, as opposed to public wars by princes and republics. An action in self-
defense did not amount up to actual war. It only allowed for limited – proportional – violence to 
ward of the attack and should end once the attack had stopped. From this, Grotius distinguished a 
defensive war. Defensive war was the prerogative of princes and republics. It was a war justified 
by the causa iusta defense, whether this was self-defense or the defense of property, subjects or 
allies. The concept of defense as a just cause was more extended. Defensive war encompassed 
preventive action. According to Grotius, fear of the might of a neighbor was insufficient as a 
cause for war unless the – aggressive – intentions of that neighbor were certain.133 Such a war 
                                                 
131 Grotius’ doctrine of intervention derived more from the humanist tradition than the neo-scholastic tradition; 
TUCK, supra note 92, at 94-108. 
132 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.1.16, and 2.20.40 and 49. 
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was justified because of its necessity, not because of the justice of its cause. Defense was only 
just if it was directed against an unjust attack. As a natural right, self-defense was also allowed 
against a just attack.134  
 In Grotius’ system, just like in medieval doctrine and with the other early modern writers 
of the law of nations, self-defense had a double function. On the one hand it was a natural right 
which gave rise to a right to use force that was limited both in relation to its goal and duration, 
and to is legal consequences. On the other hand, it could serve as a just cause for war. Like their 
medieval predecessors, most early-modern writers hardly commented upon it in relation to the 
just war, but none of them would deny that it was a just cause. Defense was predominantly 
discussed in terms of defense of third persons, or of preventive defense. 
 In the realm of the volitional law of nations, Grotius only spoke of the legality of law. 
Next to the just war (bellum iustum), Grotius thus introduced the notion of formal war (bellum 
solenne). For a war to be legal, it had to be waged by a sovereign and had to be formally 
declared. In claiming this, Grotius adhered to both Ayala’s and Gentilis’ views. In a war formally 
declared and fought between sovereigns, all belligerents were protected by the laws of war and 
could reap the benefits of the state of war, such as making booty.135 The declaration served to 
prove that it was a war between sovereigns.136
 But still, the two kinds of war were not completely separated. Even in a formal war, the 
justice of the war was not irrelevant. For Grotius it was of great consequence in relation to third 
parties. The justice of a war did not only apply to the belligerent who had just cause, but also to 
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those assisting him.137 Allies who were under an obligation by treaty to assist both sides should 
waive those obligations as regards the belligerent(s) fighting an unjust war.138 Those who were 
neutral (in bello medii) were only allowed to assist those waging a just war and were prohibited 
to hinder the same.139 Grotius also claimed that subjects who thought a war to be unjust were 
excused from serving in that war.140 In stating these claims, Grotius correctly assessed that 
justifications of the causes of war were usually of a propagandistic nature towards subjects, 
vassals, and third powers, but that they were important for that reason.141 The legal consequences 
he attributed to these were devoid of much reality, but Grotius was right to reflect the 
significance material justifications had in political reality with a place in his system of the law of 
nations.  
 Regardless of the justice or the legality of a war, Grotius strongly recommended 
sovereigns not to wage war except if it was really necessary or only for the ‘most weighty cause 
at a most opportune time.’142 Hereby, he introduced the purposes of the war into the discussion, 
                                                 
137 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.25.1.1. 
138 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.15.13. 
139 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 3.17. On neutrality in early-modern doctrine, see STEPHEN NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A GENERAL HISTORY 10-43 (2000). 
140 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.26.3. 
141 This was also a purpose of formal declaration: ‘Declarations of war in fact, as we shall shortly be saying, were 
wont to be made publicly, with a statement of the cause, in order that the whole human race as it were might judge 
of the justness of it;’ GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.26.4.7 (transl. vol. 2, 593). 
142 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 2.24.8-9 (transl. vol  .2, 575); see also the rest of Chapter 2.24. A prince also had to 
weigh the evil and the good that could come from the war. This was a traditional demand in the just war doctrine. 
JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 35 (2004). 
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not in moral terms – like ‘intention’ in the classical just war doctrine – but in terms of 
expediency. 
 The early ‘classics of international law’ up to Grotius did much to adapt the just war 
doctrine to the realities of a world where the sovereign princes were truly that, as there was no 
higher authority or even common, authoritative legal and moral framework to govern their 
actions. To guarantee that belligerents would treat one another according to the laws of war, the 
writers from the various traditions went a long way towards designing a concept of ‘legal’ war 
that was devoid of much material substance in terms of causes and goals, and was almost purely 
formalistic. The distinction between the (moral) justice and the (formal) legality of war was a 
step towards the emancipation of the law of nations from theology and the ius commune where 
Christian morality, natural law, and positive law formed an inextricable amalgam. But the 
distinction did not yet turn into an absolute rejection of the moral, natural law discourse. From 
Vitoria to Grotius, all writers of the early modern law of nations stubbornly refused to give up 
the old doctrine of the ‘just’ war and all recognized the significance of the moral-political 
justification of war. Grotius for his part even tried to recuperate it in the sphere of positive law. 
His attempt was unsuccessful and purely theoretical, but in doing so he succeeded in indicating 
the significance of material justifications: the audiences for the benefit of whom they were made. 
 
 
V. THE FRENCH AND SPANISH DECLARATIONS OF 1635 
 




 In the weeks after the French herald Gratiollet had formally declared war upon the 
Cardinal-Infante, the French government released two lengthy justifications for its actions. On 
June 6, 1635, Louis XIII had the Declaration du Roy, sur l’ouverture de la guerre contre le Roy 
d’Espagne issued, which was registered by the Parliament of Paris, the highest court of the 
realm, on 18 June.143 Around the same date, a second text was promulgated: the Manifeste du 
Roy Contenant les justes causes que sa Majesté a eües de declarer la guerre au Roy 
d’Espagne.144
 The Declaration was co-signed and edited, if not written, by Abel de Servien (1593-
1659), a jurist by training and Secretary of State for War. It had been written while the drafting 
process of the Manifeste was already well underway, and it was partly based on it. The Manifeste 
was based on an original draft by Father Joseph (1577-1638), one of Richelieu’s main advisers 
on foreign policy.145 It had later been revised by Claude le Bouthillier (1581-1652), a jurist too 
and Secretary of State for Finance, and by Richelieu.146
 The casus belli which Louis XIII had invoked in his formal declaration of May 19, 1635 
upon Spain, was the attack on Trier and the abduction of the Elector by the troops of the 
Cardinal-Infante on March 26, 1635. Earlier, the French resident diplomat in Brussels, Amontot, 
had demanded the release of the Elector of Trier in the form of an ultimatum. The refusal of the 
                                                 
143 The edition from Paris, 1635, is used here. 
144 The edition by Jacques Roussin from Lyon, 1635, is used here. 
145 François Le Clerc du Tremblay. On his foreign policy, see Fagniez, supra note 55, and ALDOUS HUXLEY, GREY 
EMINENCE: A STUDY IN RELIGION AND POLITICS (1949). 
146 On the drafting process of the texts, see Weber, supra note 17, at 97-113. The three drafts of the Manifeste are in 
the archives of the French foreign ministry: PARIS, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondance 
Politique, Espagne No. 18, 140-8 (Joseph), 149-53 (Bouthillier), and 129-32 (Richelieu). 
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Cardinal-Infante, whose evading answer had reached Louis XIII on May 9, was considered the 
direct cause for the war. In the formal declaration it was stated that the Elector fell under the 
protection of the King of France. This protection was justified because neither the Emperor nor 
any other prince proved to be capable of offering protection. The attack against the Elector went 
against the dignity of the Empire as well as against the law of nations.147
 
 
  The Manifeste du Roy 
 
 Because the Manifeste was drafted, if not finalized, before the Declaration, we will first 
discuss the former. The Manifeste du Roy took the events of Trier as the casus belli, but put them 
in a wider context. The events of March 26 were presented as only the last of a long series of 
injustices committed by the Spanish against France and its allies. The Manifeste opened by 
referring to the peace efforts made by the French King Louis XIII, going back to his accession in 
1610. The desire to ensure peace for his people had induced Louis XIII to disregard the ancient 
jealousies and ill will of the Spanish and to renew the alliance between the two crowns through a 
double marriage between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons (1615).148 Even at that time, the 
French King was already advised against such a move by his allies, who feared that Spain’s 
traditional desire for expansion and oppression would go unopposed. Since the double marriage, 
the Spanish had committed all kinds of offenses against the French King. Next, there followed a 
                                                 
147 Formal declaration of May 19, 1635 as published in 67 GAZETTE DE FRANCE 269, 272 (1635). 
148 In 1615, Louis XIII had married Anne of Austria (1601-1666), sister to the later King Philip IV and the Cardinal-
Infante. Philip IV married Louis’ sister Isabelle (1602-1644) in the same year. 
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long list of such offenses, including the attacks against Savoy (1614-1617), the attacks on the 
Grisons in the Valtelline (as of 1620) with the design of bringing ‘war from Germany to Italy 
and from Italy to Germany,’149 the Spanish intrigues to divide the French from the English 
(during the early 1620s), the exhortations to the French Huguenots to rebel (1627), and the 
attacks on Casale and Mantua while the French were engaged before La Rochelle (1628). During 
the Mantuan war, France could have inflicted a ‘just punishment’ on Spain and profit in a 
‘legitimate’ way from its victory, but had chosen not to do so and had helped Spain get out of the 
dire straits it had worked itself into.150 Spain, unrelenting, had broken the public faith and the 
treaties it had signed, and had incited the imperial troops to attack Mantua and to disturb the 
peace in Italy again. Louis XIII had thus been forced to intervene once more. After the events of 
1628-1631, Spain had lusted for revenge. The Spanish had gone as far as to incite dissent within 
the French royal house and had used the Duke of Lorraine, a sworn enemy of France, for their 
purposes. As everybody knew, they had ‘armed France against France’ and had made several 
treaties to that extent.151
                                                 
149 ‘… pour porter aysement la guerre d’Allemagne en Italie, & d’Italie en Allemagne,’ MANIFESTE, 4. 
150 ‘… une juste punition’, 6 and ‘occasion si legitime,’ MANIFESTE, 5. 
151 ‘… armé la France contre la France,’ MANIFESTE, 7. The most important of these treaties being the Treaty of May 
12, 1634 with Charles IV of Lorraine and Gaston of Orléans. In the Treaty, the Spanish promised 15,000 troops to 
the Duke of Orléans but demanded some of the conquests the Dukes would make in France in compensation; Arts. 4 
and 6, DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 73. Since 1631, the French King’s mother, Marie dei Medici (1573-1642), 
had fled to the Spanish Netherlands. From there, she worked with her younger son, Gaston d’Orléans, against his 
elder brother. On the dissensions within the French royal family and the rebellions of the 1630s, see GASTON 
DETHAN, GASTON D’ORLÉANS. CONSPIRATEUR ET PRINCE CHARMANT (1959); PAUL HENRARD, MARIE DE MÉDICIS 
DANS LES PAYS-BAS, 1631-1638 (1875); Toby Osborne, ‘Chimères, monopoles and stratagèmes’: French Exiles in 
the Spanish Netherlands during the Thirty Years’ War, 15 THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 149 (2000). 
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 The French King had patiently suffered these offenses, regardless of many pleas to the 
contrary. It had been said to the King that, while he depleted his forces without any benefit by 
having to keep a large army for his defense, the Spanish were destroying the foundations of 
‘public liberty’ – that is the liberty of all princes – and were gradually attaining their goal: the 
suppression of the Holy Roman Empire and its transformation into a permanent – read hereditary 
– monarchy of the House of Austria.152 For that purpose, they had been trying to bring some of 
the Empire’s seven electors into their camp (Mainz, Cologne, Saxony and Brandenburg) and 
destroy others (the Palatinate, Trier). Meanwhile, the Spanish extorted the Italian princes to the 
extent of making them powerless. Some also pointed out to the King the Spanish dissimulation 
concerning religion. While the Spanish styled themselves as the champions of the Catholic 
religion and professed their hatred for the Protestants, they did not refrain from making 
advantageous peace treaties with the latter and waging war upon the former.153 As some 
Protestant allies of France had indicated, there was nothing new about this tactic which went 
back to the days of Emperor Charles V.  
 All these reasons might have been enough for any other king to decide upon war. But 
Louis XIII’s resolve to work for ‘public tranquility’ and his consideration that war, even if 
sometimes necessary, must always be reserved as a last resort, had withheld him from taking this 
step. 
 The Spanish had done everything and essayed every device to lure the French into a war 
and thus deflect the blame for it upon Louis XIII. But their desire to offend had gotten the better 
                                                 
152 ‘… liberté publique,’ MANIFESTE, 7. ‘… de s’assubjettir l’Empire en forme de monarchie perpetuelle de la 
Maison d’Austriche,’ 7. 
153 This refers to the Peace of Prague of May 30, 1635 with, among others, Saxony and Brandenburg. 
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of them. Now they had gone to the extreme of laying ‘their hands upon the Archbishop of Trier, 
a sacred person, Prince and Elector of the Holy Empire.’154 Apart from disdain for the dignity of 
the Church and its prelates this act showed, it was a measure of their lack of respect for electors, 
princes of the Empire, and sovereigns in general. The act was such that the whole of Christianity 
must recognize that the French King had just cause to resent it, since the Elector was under his 
protection.155
 The French King had never stopped to support all papal initiatives to ensure a stable 
peace among Christian powers. However, even while these papal endeavors were taking place, 
the King was informed of the Spanish plans to attack France. Not only had the Spanish sent spies 
into some French provinces, but they had also prepared their fleets in Italy to attack France. The 
Spanish ambassadors in Vienna were exhorting the Emperor to declare war upon France.  
  The authors of the Manifeste next resumed their enumeration of Spanish offenses, this 
time not against France but against almost all other princes of Europe, the allies and neighbors of 
France. It was claimed that the Spanish had stirred up troubles in the Empire by inducing the 
Emperor to oppress the Protestants. They had also tried to take territories from Catholic princes 
such as the Bishop of Liège and the Archbishop of Cologne and illegally occupied the Lower 
Palatinate. They had caused trouble in the Swiss cantons and for the Grisons because of the 
Valtelline. Heeding the pleas of the Grisons, Louis XIII had sent some small contingents of 
troops to assist them. It was only after the French King had been informed of the attack on Trier 
that he allowed the Duke of Rohan to intervene with his army and prevent the Spanish from 
                                                 
154 ‘… de prendre l’Archevesque de Treves, personne sacrée, Prince & Electeur du Sainct Empire, ’ MANIFESTE, 10. 
155 ‘… lesquelles feront juger à toute la Chrestienté le juste sujet que sa Majesté a de s’en ressentir, veu l’assistance 
qu’elle donnoit à ce Prince, lequel elle tenoit en sa protection,’ MANIFESTE, 10-11. 
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occupying the Valtelline.156 Both Protestants and Catholics were said to applaud these actions. It 
was also pointed out that France had earlier protested against the Spanish infringements on the 
Peace of Cherasco (1631), which had been duly noted by the papal nuncios.  
 The Manifeste went on to deplore that Louis XIII had not been able to limit his 
intervention to the just defense of his allies and was now forced to take up arms to obtain 
reparation for all the offenses he had suffered, most particularly the capture of the Elector of 
Trier. Before he declared war, he sent his resident diplomat in the Spanish Netherlands to 
demand the release of the Elector from the Cardinal-Infante. Such a demand was just as the 
Elector was a protégé of the King. The Elector’s capture was illegal. He was a sovereign who 
lived peacefully and was not at war with any power. The King’s protection had been offered 
because the Emperor was incapable of giving his. In his response, the Cardinal-Infante had left 
no room to doubt his intention to keep the Elector in captivity. The King feared that matters 
would become even worse if he did not demand justice. The matter, so the Manifeste stated, did 
not only concern the ‘sensibility’ of great kings, but also the law of nations.157 The French King 
could not let this pass because of the offense committed against the Church in the person of one 
of its prelates. Doing nothing would also mean abandoning the allies and would encourage the 
Spanish. It would jeopardize the liberty of all. 
 According to the authors of the Manifeste, there was no doubt that the Spanish had every 
intention to attack France before the war was brought to them. The fleet that had by now 
                                                 
156 Henry, Duke of Rohan (1579-1638), was a Huguenot prince. In April 1635, before the French formally declared 
war, he led an army from Württemberg into the Valtelline (April 21) and occupied it, assisted by forces of a Swiss 
Protestant rebel; see BAUSTAEDT, supra note 55, at 154. PARROTT, supra note 53, at 117. 
157 ‘… qui ne sont pas seulement sensbibles aux grands Roys ; mais qui sont aussi les plus recommandées par le 
droict des Gens,’ MANIFESTE, 16. 
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appeared on the coasts of the Provence was proof enough for that. Knowing of these Spanish 
plans and preparations, the French King had resolved to have his troops enter the Duchy of 
Luxemburg in order to obtain redress for the many wrongs suffered.  
 With this Manifeste, the French King wanted to make public the just causes he had for 
the war, so the text continued. It was repeated that the King had wanted to limit himself to the 
defense of his allies against the most blatant oppression. The possible Spanish allegations against 
the French concerning their actions in the Empire would surely be disbelieved by anyone with 
sound judgment. The causes for the Swedish intervention, in which the French King had no part, 
were well-known. The French King was forced to intervene because of the injustices of the 
Spanish who wanted to turn the Empire into a hereditary monarchy and aspired to universal 
monarchy over the whole of Christianity.158 For the sake of these ambitions, the Spanish did not 
shrink from attacking whomsoever, often using the cause of religion as a cover for their true 
designs. Here, reference was made to the ‘unhappy’ pamphlets attacking the honor and life of 
persons who were considered sacred under divine law. 
 There could be not doubt about the ‘just and righteous intentions’ of the French King in 
declaring this war.159 His goal was peace for the whole of Christianity. God was said already to 
have sanctioned the French cause in granting the King’s army victory.160 The King’s intentions 
comprised the delivery of the Church from the troubles caused by the confusion in Italy and the 
wars between Catholic powers. He rejected all accusations against him assisting Protestant 
powers from those who themselves had wanted peace with them, only to be able to molest 
                                                 
158 ‘… la pretention imaginaire de leur Monarchie sur la Chrestienté,’ MANIFESTE, 20. 
159 ‘… ses iustes & droites intentions,’ MANIFESTE, 21. 
160 At the Battle of Les Avins on May 20, 1635. 
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Catholic powers and to bring them under their monarchy. The Manifeste ended with an 
invocation of God’s favor for the just designs of the French, which were ‘the honor of His Divine 
Majesty, the tranquility of the State, and the conservation of his good Neighbors and Allies.’161
 
 
  The Declaration du Roy 
 
 The Declaration opened with a reference to the many, well-known offenses of the 
Spanish against the French monarchy, without however listing them at this point. These offenses 
were inspired by the hatred and natural jealousy of the Spanish for the French and had always 
been committed with stealth. Now their ambition had driven them to openly oppress the allies of 
the French King. Once their covert actions to bring down the French crown had failed,162 the 
Spanish began plotting an open attack upon France. Therefore, Louis XIII could no longer 
refrain from using the power God had granted him, not only to drive the enemy back, but also to 
prevent the pending attack in a just war, which reason and law forced the King to bring to the 
Spanish lands instead of awaiting an attack upon his own.163
                                                 
161 ‘… de l’honneur de sa Divine Majesté, repos de cet Estat, & de la conservation de ses bons Voisins & Alliez,’ 
MANIFESTE, 23. 
162 This refers to the alliance with Gaston d’Orléans. 
163 ‘Nous ne pouvions, sans deffaillir à nostre Estat, & à nous-mesmes, differer davantage d’employer les forces que 
Dieu nous a données, non seulement pour repousser leurs entreprises, mais pour tâcher de les prevenir par une juste 
guerre, que toutes sortes de raisons & de Lois, nous obligent de porter plûtost dans leurs Pays, que de l’attendre dans 
nostre Royaume,’ DECLARATION, 4-5. 
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 The Declaration then turned to the period of the alliance and double marriage between 
the crowns of France and Spain, which had brought hope for a lasting peace within Christianity. 
To attain this, France had been willing to turn the page on all old quarrels. Spain should have 
forgone its unjust desire to usurp the states of its neighbors and to establish a universal 
monarchy. But neither this alliance, nor the many good offices France had granted Spain, had 
deflected Spain from these aims. To the contrary, they had only served Spain because it could 
now operate by stealth. France’s trust had turned to its detriment. At this point, some instances of 
France’s goodwill towards Spain were mentioned. These included the active intervention of the 
King’s father, Henry IV (1589-1610), to promote the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609) as well as the 
French diplomatic offensive during the Bohemian rebellion (1618-1621) to have Bavaria and the 
Catholic League support the Emperor and neutralize some of the Protestant princes of the 
Empire. In recompense for these services, the Spanish had then taken the Valtelline from the 
Grisons, allies of France, without any other explanation than that they needed the valley to shift 
their troops from Spain and Italy to Germany and the Netherlands, and vice versa. Their 
duplicity had further been proven by their refusal to execute the ensuing Treaty of Monzon 
(1626) as well as by their maneuvering at the time of the Treaty of Cherasco (1631). Here, the 
same offenses committed by the Spanish since the accession of Louis XIII that were mentioned 
in the Manifeste, were listed. Explicit reference was made to the Treaty of May 12, 1634 with 
which Spain tried to arm France against itself and the text of which had fallen into the hands of 
the King. In short, the Spanish friendship had resulted in nothing but assistance to internal 
dissenters and exhortations against France and its allies. 
 Until this time, so the Declaration stated, the French King had done nothing but 
neutralize all the Spanish enterprises and protect his friends and states against the evils prepared 
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for them. But now the King had to recognize that his moderation had made the Spanish more 
audacious since experience had taught them that they could always keep the peace and stay out 
of harm’s way. Therefore, he was now forced to express his resentment about the offenses he had 
suffered and to stop the Spanish once and for all. The King acknowledged that his moderation 
after his victories in Italy in 1629 and during the times of trouble for the Habsburg in the Empire 
during the last years as well as his preference for ‘public peace’ over ‘just vengeance’164 had not 
dissuaded the Spanish from their continuous conspiracies nor stopped them from constantly 
pitting new enemies against France.165 This ‘simulated peace, this covert war’ was all the more 
dangerous because ‘their stratagems were since long more to be feared than their forces.’166 It 
allowed the Spanish to enjoy the sureties of peace, while they forced upon France the 
disadvantages and perils of war. But all this was coming to an end. Now their passion had 
prevented the Spanish from further hiding their designs and they were openly preparing for war 
against France. They had accused the French of being allied with Protestant powers. But they 
themselves had acted contrary to the interests of the Catholic faith, while they used the same 
faith to cover up their injustices. They did not hesitate to make promises that were incompatible 
with one another and attack France with all their might. It had come to such a point that the King 
of France would almost feel guilty himself for the losses his people would suffer if he did not, 
                                                 
164 ‘… si nous n’eussions toûjours preferé le desir de la paix publique, à celuy d’une juste vengeance,’ 
DECLARATION, 13. 
165 ‘… n’y diminüé l’aigreur avec laquelle ils travaillent à nous jetter tous les jours sur les bras de nouveaux 
Ennemis,’ DECLARATION, 13. 
166 ‘… une paix déguisée, une guerre couverte, d’autant plus dangereuse, que leurs artifices ont esté de tous temps 
beaucoup plus à craindre, que leurs forces,’ DECLARATION, 13. 
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thanks to his ‘just foresight’, use his most powerful means to safeguard his people, even at the 
risk of his own person. 
 The authors of the Declaration now turned to the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. It 
was said that it had been the ‘place of arms’ of the Spanish and that they had wanted to turn it 
into the basis for an ‘immortal war’ to subject the people they had recognized to be free in 
treaties as well as to check France.167 They had continuously tried to steal away fortresses on the 
borders of France, mostly through stratagems. Their seasoned troops in the Netherlands 
constituted such a threat that they could either surprise France, or bleed it dry by forcing it to 
spend as much in peacetime as in war. Nobody could therefore deny it to be honorable and useful 
to search for more security and a true peace by way of arms, rather than to see the French forces 
dwindle away and see the people languish under ‘a doubtful and uncertain peace France had to 
safeguard with 150,000 men.’168
 Reference was made to the French cooperation in the peace initiatives of the papal 
nuncios. According to the Declaration, the French King had even now contemplated not to open 
hostilities yet and to content himself with strengthening his defenses and await the attack. But he 
had had to change his mind because of the grave violation of the law of nations the attack on the 
Elector of Trier constituted. This was said to concern all princes of Christianity. The attack on 
the Elector’s capital, where he was living in peace, his status as a French protégé, the refusal to 
release him, and the mockery that was the answer the French King received from the Cardinal-
Infante, all these injustices forced the King to take action. As king of a realm that had waged so 
                                                 
167 In the Twelve Years’ Truce of Antwerp of April 9, 1609, King Philip III and the Archdukes Albrecht and Isabella 
had called the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic ‘free’; Art. 1, DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 5-2, 99, 100. 
168 ‘… une pais douteuse & incertaine, qu’il faut conserver avec cent cinquante mil’hommes,’ DECLARATION, 17. 
 65 
 
many wars in defense of its allies and had been the safehaven of the afflicted and the support of 
the oppressed for such a long time, Louis XIII had no other choice.  
 It was the combination of the series of old offenses and the most recent injuries that had 
convinced the French King to break with the King of Spain. But before he commenced 
hostilities, he had sent a herald to the Cardinal-Infante so that he would not be surprised by the 
invasion of his lands. God, in his divine wisdom, had informed the French of the Spanish plans 
to have France invaded from the Netherlands by Prince Thomas of Savoy, from the east by 
Charles IV of Lorraine, and from the Mediterranean by the Spanish fleet. God had allowed the 
French to nip the first invasion in the but, repulse the second, and be prepared for the third.  
 For all these reasons, the French King, the Declaration continued, declared ‘open war by 
sea and by land on the King of Spain, his subjects, lands, and vassals in order to obtain redress 
for the wrongs, injuries and offenses committed against the King, his estates, subjects and 
allies.’169 The King hoped that God, who had already indicated the justice of the French designs 
by granting them an early victory, would continue to assist them so that he could establish ‘a sure 
and durable peace within Christianity.’170 In order to achieve this goal more speedily, the King 
called upon all ‘princes, states, and republics who loved peace and are concerned with public 
liberty’, to take up arms and join him.171
 Next, the King of France ordered all his subjects, vassals, and servants to make war by 
land and sea on the King of Spain, his lands, subjects, vassals, and adherents who were declared 
                                                 
169 ‘… la guerre ouverte par mer & par terre audit Roy d’Espagne, ses Subjets, Pays, & Vassaux, pour tirer raison 
sur eux, des torts, injures, & offenses que Nous, nos Estats, Subjets, & Alliez, en ont receuës,’ DECLARATION, 23. 
170 ‘… une seure & durable Paix dans la Chrestienté,’ DECLARATION, 23. 




enemies of the King, the state, and public peace. The Declaration stipulated the implications of 
the state of war. The subjects of the enemy could be taken prisoner, held for ransom, or treated 
according to the laws of war. It was forbidden to communicate or trade with the Spanish, under 
the penalty of death. All passports and safe passages were revoked. 
 The Declaration restated the main outlines of the alliance treaty France had made with 
the Republic on 8 February 1635 concerning the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. It was 
stated that this would be the first military operation of the war because it would end the long and 
unfortunate war waged in the Netherlands and because it would liberate the population there 
from Spanish oppression. The King reiterated his promise that if the people from the Spanish 
Netherlands would drive the Spanish from their towns and places within two months after the 
Declaration, these places would form a free and sovereign state and the Catholic faith would be 
safeguarded. The King promised to protect the people of the Spanish Netherlands during the war 
and look after their interests in the ensuing peace treaties. If they would wish so, the King was 
prepared to make a defensive and offensive alliance with them, together with the Republic, and 
to include them in all future peace treaties. Even if only three or four towns close to one another 
were to rise and liberate themselves, they would be allowed to form a free state. The Declaration 
concluded with an order to all officials of the realm to publish and register the text and to 
observe and enforce it. 
 The author of the Declaration du Roy of June 6, 1635, most likely Abel de Servien, made 
use of the draft of the Manifeste but clearly added some different accents. Both texts employed 
the same arguments and referred to the same facts, but there was a difference. The Manifeste 
stressed that France undertook the war to save the whole of Christian Europe from Spanish 
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oppression.172 The Declaration played down this argument and argued somewhat more along the 
lines of French interests. This is made most clear by considering the differing structures of the 
two texts. While the Manifeste started by stating the many offenses Spain had committed against 
the whole of Christianity – France and its allies –, the first paragraphs of the Declaration 
underscored the offenses suffered by the French King. In the Manifeste, the attack on Trier was 
the last of a long line of offenses by the Spanish against the ‘public liberty’ of Europe, whereas 
in the Declaration it was yet another attack on French interests and honor.173  
                                                 
172 Claude le Bouthillier and Richelieu had made quite some changes to Joseph’s draft, downplaying the European 
and Christian dimensions a bit; see Weber, supra note 17, at 106-7. 
173 According to Hermann Weber, the differences have to be explained from the difference in view on foreign policy 
held by Father Joseph, who was close to Richelieu, and by Servien, who was close to the King. This discrepancy 
between the King’s entourage and that of the Cardinal-Minister went back to the debate both leaders had had during 
the summer of 1634 about a rupture with Spain. At that time, the King was most aggrieved by the offensive alliance 
signed between Philip IV and his rebellious brother Gaston. He constantly pressurized Richelieu for war with Spain. 
The Cardinal-Minister withstood that pressure and wanted to prolong his ‘war by proxy’ for as long as he could. In 
June 1634, Richelieu wrote a lengthy memoir to argue his case. In it, he rejected the recent Dutch proposal to jointly 
attack and divide the Spanish Netherlands. First, the war would be a war of conquest. The inhabitants of the Spanish 
Netherlands might not welcome the domination of the French and the Protestant Dutch might come to replace their 
Spanish rulers. Second, it would leave the French and the Dutch direct neighbors, a situation that would lead to 
conflict. Third, a war might weaken the Spanish to the extent that France would then have to shoulder the burden of 
the defense of the Catholic faith against the Protestants alone. Richelieu advised to abide with the Alliance Treaty of 
April 15, 1634 in which France had promised new subsidies for the Dutch war effort. In his letter of August 4, 1634 
to the Cardinal-Minister, King Louis XIII made the case for war, arguing that the circumstances would never be so 
advantageous to France as they were at the time. As cause for the war, he invoked the attacks by Spain on France 
through the services of members of his family. Whereas the King only heeded the interests of France, the Cardinal-





The Spanish declarations 
 
Though the war had been raging for over a month by June 24, 1635, on that day the Cardinal-
Infante had his Declaration de son Alteze touchant la guerre contre la couronne de France 
published in Brussels.174 The text was in the first place aimed at the population of the Spanish 
Netherlands. In the light of the French and Dutch claims that they came to ‘liberate’ the 
Netherlands from Spanish oppression and their call upon the people to rise, it was important to 
explain the justice of the Spanish cause to the local nobility and elite. This was all the more 
important as in 1632-1633 there had been serious trouble with the estates in the Spanish 
Netherlands, where, moreover, some nobles and higher officers had conspired against Spain.175 
The text was issued two weeks after the Franco-Dutch invaders brutally sacked the small town of 
Tienen to the east of Brussels and on the day they laid siege to Leuven. Apart from offering a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Catholic religion. Memoir of Richelieu of June 1634, supra note 71, at 466-8; Lettre du Roy à Son Eminence sur le 
sujet de l’ouverture de la guerre, supra note 48, at 18-19. Treaty of 15 April 1634, published in DU MONT, supra 
note 15, vol. 6-1, 69. Anuschka Tischer, however, forwards the view that the difference is consequential to the fact 
that both texts were addressed to slightly different audiences.  Whereas the Declaration was mainly aimed at the 
French power elite, the Manifesto was also written for foreign audiences. Both explanations seem plausible and are 
not mutually exclusive. 
174 Here the French text published by Hubert Velpius in Brussels, 1635, will be used. 
175 Alicia Esteban Estringana, La crise politique de 1629-1633 et le début de la prééminence institutionnelle de 
Pierre Roose dans le gouvernement des Pays-Bas Catholiques, 76 REVUE BELGE DE PHILOLOGIE ET D’HISTOIRE 
939(1998); Paul Janssens, L’échec des tentatives de soulèvement aux Pays-Bas sous Philippe IV (1621-1665), 92 
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE 110 (1978); VERMEIR, supra note 68, at 63-90. 
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justification for the Spanish cause, the text was a formal declaration of war issued in the name of 
Philip IV. The author of the text is unknown, but it is likely that some of the main ministers of 
the Cardinal-Infante had a say in the drafting of the text. Among them were probably the 
Cardinal-Infante’s second-in-command, Francisco de Moncada, Marquis of Aytona (†1635), 
Don Martin de Axpe, head of the Secretariat for State and War, the Cardinal-Infante’s confessor, 
Juan de San Agustin, and Pierre Roose (1586-1673), the powerful Chief-President of the Privy 
Council in the Spanish Netherlands and a trustee of Olivares.176 Axpe and Roose were both 
university-trained jurists. 
 On June 2, 1635, Olivares had stated that the Spanish government needed a general paper 
or letter to defend the Spanish cause and to address to the Pope and the princes of Europe, as 
well as some manifestos to distribute within France. A junta was convened to prepare such texts. 
It consisted of Francisco de Calatayud, royal secretary, Alonso Guillén de la Carrera,177 a jurist 
and polemicist, as well as Juan de Palafox y Mendoza (1609-1659), also a jurist and the future 
Bishop of Pueblo de los Angeles in Mexico.178 This junta drafted a lengthy declaration in the 
name of Philip IV, the Declaracion de don Felipe Cuarto, Rey de las Españas, al rompimiento 
de la guerra que sin denunciarla ha hecho Luys, Rey de Francia.179 It was, however, not put into 
print. By the time the junta was ready – sometime by the end of July 1635 –, the French had 
                                                 
176 On Roose, see RENÉ DEPLANCHE, UN LÉGISTE ANVEROIS AU SERVICE DE L’ESPAGNE : PIERRE ROOSE, CHEF-
PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ DES PAYS-BAS, 1586-1673 (1945). 
177 He was also the author of the MANIFIESTO DE ESPAÑA Y FRANCIA (before the war of 1635), to be found in 
MADRID, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 2.366, 218-345, in which he defended the Spanish view on Europe. JOVER, supra 
note 15, at 166-90. 
178 ELLIOTT, supra note 45, at 489-90. 
179 Here the manuscript from MADRID, National Library, Ms. 290, 103, was used. 
 70
 
already issued both the Declaration and the Manifeste. But in the months to come, many 
polemicists on the Spanish side, some of them high officials in the service of the King, would 
take up their pens and write in defense of their sovereign.180 Because the Declaracion de don 
Felipe Cuarto was not issued, it will treated fairly briefly below. 
 
 
  The Declaration of the Cardinal-Infante 
 
The Cardinal-Infante’s Declaration opened by referring to the Peace of Vervins of May 2, 1598, 
the most recent peace treaty between France and Spain.181 The Cardinal-Infante’s grandfather, 
Philip II (1558-1598), had decided upon peace at the exhortation of the Pope, thus ending the 
misery that the war had brought over Christianity. France had promised that it would strictly 
abide with this treaty between the two leading Catholic powers. The treaty had invoked the wrath 
of God on whom would first break it.182 As is commonly known, France had never respected the 
peace but had maintained its old alliances and entered into new ones that were against Spain. It 
had continued to support the Dutch rebels with men and money and had helped them fight both 
the faith and Spanish sovereignty. King Philip III as well as the Archdukes Albrecht (1598-1621) 
and Isabella (1598-1633) had always preferred to ignore these offenses. They had placed the 
common peace above their own interests, even when King Henry IV of France started to stir up 
trouble for the whole of Europe. As it befitted the holder of the title of ‘Catholic King’, Philip III 
                                                 
180 JOVER, supra note 15, at 263-387 
181 Published in DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 5-1, 561. 
182 There was no such invocation in the treaty texts or the ratifications by Philip II or Henry IV. 
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continued to reward evil with goodness in assisting the current French King Louis XIII against 
the discontent of his own subjects. But princes could not continue to condone the provocations of 
their neighbors if these harmed their own subjects. 
 With regret, the Cardinal-Infante was obliged to state that that point had been reached. He 
did this in the name of the King, who himself was still withholding his resentment because of the 
generosity which characterized a great prince. But it would be weakness rather than discretion to 
remain passive in the face of the acts of some of those close to the French King, who had now 
finally succeeded in persuading him to direct all his forces against the House of Austria. These 
people wanted to enjoy peace within France, while violating it outside their borders. The 
Declaration listed a series of events leading up to the ongoing invasion. The French were at the 
root of many troubles experienced by the King of Spain, going from war to rebellion. They had 
tried to steal away some towns by way of treason,183 had imposed new taxes and duties contrary 
to the Peace of Vervins,184 had violated the immunity of the Spanish King’s couriers traveling 
through France, and had invaded Luxemburg, Artois, and the County of Burgundy. 
 The alliance the French and the Dutch rebels had recently signed would convince 
everybody not to put any trust in them.185 In it, ‘they have already carved up the loyal provinces 
of the Netherlands, even before they have occupied them.’186 Meanwhile, the French and the 
                                                 
183 Here, reference is made to a plot of 1632-1633, when some noblemen and military commanders from the Spanish 
Netherlands conspired to turn over some fortresses to the French; Janssens, supra note 175, at 110-18. 
184 Art. 3 of the Treaty stipulated that the subjects and merchants of the other signatory would only be reasonably 
taxed; DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 5-1, 561. 
185 This is, of course, the Alliance Treaty of February 8, 1635. 
186 ‘… ayans partagé les Provinces obeissantes auparavant de les avoir occupées,’ DECLARATION, 4. 
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Dutch had committed such atrocities against the town of Tienen, that posterity would have a hard 
time believing it.  
 The treachery of the French King was clear from the way the war had started. He had 
needed to declare war openly to convince his rebel allies to start the campaign. But he had not 
dared to risk his own subjects before he was assured about the success of his evil designs. 
Therefore, he had the invading troops march under the colors of the Prince of Orange.187 Only 
after they had met with some success did he change his course and use ‘the pretext of demanding 
the Archbishop of Trier.’188
 In any case, the French King should not have acted before the Cardinal-Infante had 
received an answer from the Emperor and the King of Spain to his questions in the matter of the 
Elector of Trier. But against the law and the usages of war,189 Louis XIII had declared war using 
the case of Trier as a pretext. That this was nothing but a pretext was proven by the Franco-
Dutch Treaty and the fact that the French King had already commenced hostilities before ‘a 
certain person’ had come to Brussels. He came ‘so it was claimed, in the capacity of herald, 
though he was not as he did not carry the essential signs nor did he behave like a herald, nor did 
he even produce a commission or credentials.’190  
 At first, the Cardinal-Infante had been willing to receive this man as he had wanted to 
take every chance to show the justice of his actions to the world. But he had decided against it 
because he did not want to create a precedent and did not want to lose respect. Reference was 
                                                 
187 Frederick Henry, Stadtholder of Holland and captain-general of the Dutch army (1625-1647). 
188 ‘… il prit le le pretexte de demander l’Archevesque de Treves,’ DECLARATION, 5. 
189 ‘… contre tout droict & usages de guerre,’ DECLARATION, 5. 
190 ‘… (comme l’on pretend) en qualité d’herault, sans l’estre, ny en porter les marques essentielles, ny se conduire 
comme tel, & moins en exhiber aucune commission, ou lettre de creance,’ DECLARATION, 5. 
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made to an incident involving the King of England, who had been duped into believing someone 
was a herald of the King of France.191 France had abused the office of heraldry in the past and 
must now suffer that it had lost its credibility. The sending of the herald was neither lawful nor 
civil, as the Spanish King could hardly have received the Cardinal-Infante’s messages 
concerning Trier in time nor had received word from his brother. The Elector of Trier was, 
furthermore, not subject to the King of France or to the laws of his realm and was not openly 
under his protection. The Elector had been thanking God and the heavens ever since he had been 
liberated from the bad treatment and insolences he had suffered at the hands of the French.192 In 
the meantime, the King of Spain, who was protector of the town of Trier,193 and the Emperor 
who judged in such cases, were seized by the matter. Any measures concerning the person of the 
Elector were sanctioned by the Emperor. Therefore, it was no wonder that no other Christian 
prince had taken on his cause. It was hard to understand that the French King had taken up arms 
to fight for a subject of the Empire against his own Emperor and against the council of the judges 
the Elector himself recognized as being competent. For this feat, the French King argued that he 
                                                 
191 During the sixteenth century, the stratagem to dress up somebody else as a herald and have him declare war had 
been used. It was considered the ultimate insult to the receiving prince; STEINLEIN, supra note 13, at 23-4.  
192 It was true that the Elector of Trier had frequently complained in 1633 about the behavior of the French garrisons 
within his territories; WEBER, supra note 49, at 238-59. That the Elector considered his abduction to be a liberation 
was somewhat more than a euphemism, and the Cardinal-Infante knew this. In a letter to Philip IV of May 15, 1635 
the Cardinal-Infante had reported on his visit to the Elector. He explained that he had tried to persuade the Elector 
that he should not consider himself a prisoner. The Cardinal-Infante somewhat weakly stated that the Elector had 
seemed to accept that; published in CORRESPONDANCE DE LA COUR D’ESPAGNE, supra note 69, vol. 3, 56. 
193 During the early 1630s, the town of Trier had repeatedly called upon the Spanish to help them in their conflict 
with the Elector. They had invited a Spanish garrison into the town, which was driven out by the French in 1632. 
WEBER, supra note 49, at 227. 
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fought in defense of an ally. But this alliance, which hardly deserved that name, was not just and 
it postdated the Peace of Vervins and the double marriages of 1615, which were instrumental in 
safeguarding peace within Christianity. 
 The Cardinal-Infante had not broken the peace nor had he done anything that would 
allow the French King to start a war. Making use of the full powers he had received to that extent 
from the King of Spain, he declared in the name of the King that the French King, his lands, 
subjects, vassals, and adherents were enemies of the King and crown of Spain. He declared open 
war by sea and land against them, in their capacity of violators of the law of nations, supporters 
of heretics, and disturbers of the Catholic religion as well as of the peace in the Spanish 
Netherlands. He ordered all the subjects of the King to open hostilities against the King of 
France and his lands, subjects, vassals, and adherents and prohibited all communications, 
commerce, and agreements. It was also forbidden to pay any taxes or duties, this all under the 
penalty of death. The Declaration revoked all passports and safepassages for the French and 
their adherents. Moreover, all French found within the Spanish lands would be arrested and their 
properties and assets seized.  
 
 
  The Declaracion of Philip IV 
 
The Declaracion, prepared for Philip IV, commenced by laying the blame for the rivalry 
between the crowns of France and Spain with the French. Their envy, their desire to change the 
world and to destroy the House of Austria, which was the bulwark of the Catholic faith and had 
assisted the French in so many ways, was at the root of all troubles. Since long, France was 
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doing everything in its power to harm Spain, even while it was fighting the ‘Saracenes.’194 Its 
hatred for the House of Austria was such that France had even committed the ‘incredible 
impiety’ of cooperating with the Turks, ‘the first enemy of the faith.’195 Just like the Declaration 
of the Cardinal-Infante, the Madrid text referred to the many infringements of the French on the 
Peace of Vervins. Apart from the French support to the Dutch rebels, cooperation with the Turks 
and French incursions into Italy were mentioned. A long list of all the offenses the French had 
committed against the Spanish ensued. The text named support to the Dutch rebels, alliances 
with German Protestant princes aimed at suppressing the Catholic princes of the Empire,196 the 
French occupation of Lorraine, Alsace (1631-1634) and the Valtelline (1635), attacks on Susa 
(1629), Pinerolo (1631), Cologne, and Trier (1633), attempts against Spanish fortresses (1633), 
the open rupture by the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands and the ending of all commerce 
(1635), the arrest of Spanish subjects and the violation of their passports and countless 
infringements of the Treaties of Monzon (1626), Regensburg (1630),197 Cherasco (1631), as well 
as Vervins (1598). All these actions had caused ‘great harm to the respublica christiana’.198 The 
Spanish King wanted to force the French to abide by the treaties and to restitute all they had 
unjustly taken. He also demanded them to stop their support for the Protestant heretics. 
 The King of Spain had therefore decided to take up arms and reduce the French to what 
was ‘just and honest.’ He did it for the ‘universal good of the whole of Europe’ and in assistance 
                                                 
194 ‘… los Sarracenos,’ DECLARACION, 104. 
195 ‘… ympiedad incredible’ and ‘enemigo mayor de la fee,’ DECLARACION, 104. 
196 Not only those of the Thirty Years’ War, but also those of the sixteenth century commencing with the Treaty of 
Chambord of October 5, 1551, DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 4-3, 31. 
197 Which Louis XIII refused to ratify. 
198 ‘… tan gran dano de la republica Christiana,’ DECLARACION, 106. 
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of the vassals of both crowns, so that they all would enjoy peace and tranquility in the future.199 
The war was first and foremost a war in defense of the faith, and the Catholic King Philip IV 
waged it rather in his capacity of ‘Catholic’ than of ‘King’. He could not condone that the enemy 
would do so much damage to the faith and the entire Christian republic. He would enforce divine 
justice upon them.  
 Peace was said to be the only licit goal for war, but that did not mean that injustices 
should be suffered. The offenses committed by the French against the Church, the Crown, and 
the House of Austria were of such a magnitude that, since open war had broken out, the King 
could not accept them any longer without causing irreparable harm to the majesty and reputation 
of the Spanish arms. The French had, so it was alleged, waged a terrible war upon Spain in the 
name of peace. To achieve this, the French had bought with money what they refrained from 
buying through the use of arms. While their allies worked for them, they reaped the fruits of 
peace at home. Philips IV’s magnanimity made this possible. 
 Spain had always desired and worked for peace. It had refrained from war after the Peace 
of Regensburg and the Peace of Cherasco had been violated by the French. Nor had Spain taken 
up arms when the French plotted the Swedish invasion of Germany. They had assisted the 
                                                 
199 ‘Y para consequir estos tan grandes fines que han de redundar en mayor gloria de Dios, conseguir tropheos 
gloriosos de nuestros enemigos que, cediendo en bien universal de toda Europa, e alivio de los vasallos de ambas 
Coronas que puedan goçar de Paz, reposso y tranquilidad, sin desistir de sus artes y commercios en que la Provincias 
de Italia son tambien ynteressadas ; y finalmente para librarles de el peligro de las armas enemigas y del contajio de 
la heregia, hemos resuelto con celo ardiente, atentos al exemplo de nuestros ascendientes gloriosos, emplear nuestras 
armas siempre valerosa presentandonos en la campaña, con exercito tan numeroso que se digno de nuestra grandeza, 
poderosso para domar los francesses gente mas jactanciosa que vellicosa, y reducirlos a lo justo y onesto que es lo 
que siempre hemos deseado y desearemos, haciendo el ultimo esfuerzo,’ DECLARACION, 106.  
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French in the siege of La Rochelle, wanting to help the French King in his fight against the 
Huguenots.200 But the French had committed one offense after another, attacking the Spanish 
interests in Italy and the Netherlands. It was, worst of all, their support to the Dutch rebels that 
served the cause of heresy most and did so much damage to the faith. Their help to the Dutch 
allowed these to continue their attacks on the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in the Indies, 
including assaults on the Catholic missionaries there. This was all made possible through the 
endeavors of one who claimed the title of Most Christian King.  
 The French aspired to nothing less than usurpation of the Empire and the destruction of 
the House of Austria. For this purpose, they had constantly stirred up wars in the Empire, the 
Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Asia, and America and had sent army upon army against the 
Catholic powers of Europe. They had cooperated with the Turks (since 1536), the rebels from 
Bohemia and the Palatinate (1618), the Hungarian rebel Bethlen Gabor (1580-1629, from 1618), 
the Swedes, the imperial general Albrecht von Wallenstein (1583-1634) during his conspiracy 
against the Emperor (1633-1634),201 the Grisons, and close to all heretic estates of the Empire. 
They subsidized the Dutch and the Palatinate Elector.202 They had tried to dissuade Catholic 
Bavaria from its alliance with the Emperor. The French alliances with the Swedes203 and the 
                                                 
200 The Spanish had indeed sent, somewhat belatedly, a fleet to assist the French and ward off the English fleet. 
Richelieu had refused to acknowledge the help and had thus insulted the Spanish by doing so (1627). ELLIOTT, supra 
note 45, at 328-9. 
201 At the end of his life, Wallenstein had been pursuing an independent diplomacy, which Spain found harmful to 
itself. In 1634, he was murdered by order of Emperor Ferdinand II. 2 PARKER, supra note 42, at 124-5. 
202 Frederick V of the Palatinate (1596-1632), who had been elected King of Bohemia by the rebels of 1618 and had 
lost his lands in the first years of the Thirty Years’ War.  
203 The Treaty of Bärwalde of January 13, 1631 is mentioned, DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 1. 
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German Protestants204 were clearly contrary to the Treaty of Regensburg, which prohibited such 
a thing.205 By allying themselves to the heretics, the French had become little better than heretics 
themselves. But God had already punished them for their insolence by setting loose both the 
Huguenots and members of the royal house upon the French government.  
 The French had tried to cover up their misdeeds by claiming that they fought for the 
liberation of their neighbors. They used this scam to support those who rebelled against their 
rightful rulers and suzerains. Their true ambition was to tear down the greatness of Spain and 
they acted ‘against justice, peace of the laws,’ which they should respect by the commands of 
God and nature.206  
 The French had been disturbing the peace of Europe for a long time now. In those 
circumstances, it would be better to have an open war than such a peace, both for the stability of 
the realm and for the conservation of the faith. Spain must therefore take up arms against the 
coalition of France, Sweden, the Protestant League of Heilbronn, and the Republic, whose sole 
goal was the destruction of the true religion. 
 Spain for its part had never made alliances with heretics. It had made peace, or accepted a 
truce if reason and the good of the Church had dictated such a course of action. This had 
happened because Spain had been exhausted by the continuous attacks of its enemies. 
 The authors of the Declaracion returned to the many misdeeds of the French of the 1620s 
and the 1630s. Again their attacks on the Valtelline (1625) and Mantua (1629), their 
infringements of the Peace of Regensburg (1630) and the occupation of Lorraine (1631-1634) 
                                                 
204 Reference is made here to the Treaty of Frankfurt with the Protestant League of Heilbronn of September 20, 
1634; DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 78. 
205 Treaty of Regensburg of October 13, 1630, Art. 1; DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 5-2, 615, 616. 
206 ‘… contra la Iusticia, la Paz y las Leyes,’ DECLARACION, 124. 
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were reviewed. This time, the series of violations of the peace was crowned with their violent 
and brutal occupation of the Electorate of Trier (1632). The French were accused of having taken 
the Elector captive in his own lands. Then, when the Spanish took the legitimate action to free 
him from their oppression in the name of supreme justice, they had invoked this as a pretext and 
invaded Spanish territory ‘contrary to all law.’207 The Spanish King, however, was the hereditary 
protector of the Electorate of Trier in his capacity of Duke of Luxemburg. This had been 
confirmed by two electors acting as commissaries of the Empire. So, the Spanish King had every 
right to intervene and drive out the French in the name of the Empire. The French had, after all, 
allowed heretics into these Catholic lands, molested the burghers of the town of Trier, and made 
infringements on the sovereign rights of the Emperor. The Elector had been brought into 
Luxemburg and the Spanish Netherlands and had expressed his thanks to the Cardinal-Infante for 
his liberation from French oppression. The dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the Emperor and 
the imperial courts. 
 The declaration of war to the Cardinal-Infante was invalid because it had been addressed 
to the captain-general of the King of Spain, and not to himself. The Romans already had once 
declared war on an eastern king because he had negotiated with a general, and not with the 
Senate. Moreover, France had already started its invasion before it had declared war. It had also 
brought a Protestant army into the Empire208 and tried to force Bavaria to withdraw from the 
war. At this point, the Declaracion retook the long list of French offenses extensively. This time 
it ended with the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands and the sacking of Tienen on June 9, 1635. 
The Declaracion mentioned the liberation of Leuven by the Cardinal-Infante, which allows us to 
                                                 
207 ‘… contra todo derecho,’ DECLARACION, 129. 
208 The army of the Duke of Rohan in Württemberg before he diverted to the Valtelline. 
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date the text at least two to three weeks after July 3, 1635. The attempts of the French and the 
Dutch rebels to have Spain’s loyal subjects of the Netherlands rise against their King, misfired. 
 After it had tried to stir up all Christian princes as well as the infidels against the House 
of Austria and had failed to bring it down, France had seen no alternative but to take up arms 
itself. Hiding behind their so-called desire for universal peace and the unity of Christianity, the 
French strove to bring down any prince who was greater than themselves. But in fact, France 
itself aspired to universal domination and wanted to bring all princes under its sway. Therefore, 
it wanted to keep the Empire divided so that it could ruin all. 
 The march of heresy, the oppression of the true faith, and the frequent attacks on Spain’s 
lands and allies had now led to war. Spain had always worked for peace and done everything in 
its power to prevent such a rupture. It still desired a universal peace. Spain ‘had made clear to the 
world that its war was purely defensive, even if the causes to make it offensive had been 
exorbitant and implacable to the extent that Spain could very well retaliate for the offenses 
committed against its allies.’209 So now, for the natural duty of defense of his realms, and on 
behalf of the Church, which the King of Spain protected by arms in its hour of need against the 
attacks of France and its sects, and for the sake of the King’s allies and family, Philip IV would 
force King Louis of France to stop his injustices, force him to abide to his treaty obligations with 
the Emperor and with Spain, to restitute the fortresses he had taken from the Emperor and the 
Duke of Lorraine, the House of Austria and its allies and to force upon him a firm and stable 
                                                 
209 ‘… haciendo manifiesto al mundo como nuestra guerra es defensiva solo, aunque han sido tan exorbitantes las 
causas para hacerla ofensiva e implacable y retariarle los estragos que nos ha causado y a nuestros amigos y deudos, 
y para la defensa natural que devemos a nuestros Reynos y estados,’ DECLARACION, 140. 
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peace. The King promised that he had no intention to occupy any part of France by force of arms 
to which he held no just claim. 
 The text ended with an exhortation to all princes and states, that could not but 
acknowledge the justice of the King’s defensive cause to join him. It was God’s cause also 
because it was a war in defense of the Church. However, its purpose was surely not to convert 
the heretics by force of arms. All princes should help Spain to ward off France’s tyranny from 
their own doorstep. The war had to be waged for the faith of Austria, the justice of Spain, and for 
public peace. After all, the King was only king in the name of God. 
 
 
VI. JUST AND LEGAL WAR IN 1635 
 
The legality of the war 
 
By 1635, the distinction between the legality and the justice of war was well established in 
doctrine, even if the term ‘legality’ had not been coined yet. Ayala, Gentilis as well as Grotius 
demanded that for a war to be legal, and thus for the ius in bello to apply, it had to be waged 
between sovereigns and had to be formally declared. 
 It was not disputed in the declarations that warfare was the privilege of sovereigns;  the 
Kings of both Spain and France were certainly that. Also, neither would take offense at the idea 
that war was the privilege of the highest authority within a realm. Spanish authors had been 
arguing for the better part of a century that the war against the Dutch Republic was not a war but 
a punitive action against rebels. Just six years earlier, with the siege of La Rochelle, Louis XIII 
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and Richelieu had completed their campaign to break the military and diplomatic power of the 
Huguenots and some major French magnates.210
 Though the terms were not used, the drafters of the four declarations were concerned 
about showing that the war was ‘legal’ or ‘solemn’ on their part.211 They accepted that a war had 
to be declared for the state of war to begin. The validity of the formal declaration of May 19, 
1635 constituted a point of concern to the authors of all four texts. 
 The declaration of war by herald had already fallen into disuse by 1635. As it was 
pointed out above, the reasons for Louis XIII and Richelieu to take this strange course were 
political. After having been involved in a ‘war by proxy’ for years and having withstood the 
pressure from their allies to openly break with Spain, they wanted to send a clear signal that they 
were doing so now. The message was first and foremost directed at the Dutch who were 
expected to start their invasion of the Spanish Netherlands at the same time the French did. Even 
after the declaration was made, doubts persisted whether the French were serious, as it appears 
from a letter Grotius wrote from France on May 28, 1635.212 An additional reason for sending a 
herald may have been that the French could thus make the most of their indignation at the casus 
belli they invoked.  
                                                 
210 In the seventeenth century, the right to wage war was not limited to ‘sovereigns’ as we would understand that 
concept now. There were some semi-sovereign princes and republics, who were not under any real and effective 
higher authority as the princes and states of the Kingdom of Italy, fief of the Emperor, whose ius belli went 
undisputed. The right of the estates of the Holy Roman Empire to wage war and make treaties was disputed by the 
belligerents of the Thirty Years’ War. 
211 The authors of the Cardinal-Infante’s declaration used the term ‘law and usages of war’ once in connection to the 
invalidity of the French formal declaration; supra note 189. 
212 Letter of Grotius to Nicholas Reigerberch, May 28, 1635, supra note 9, vol. 5, 511, 513. 
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 The fact that the French addressed the declaration of war to the Cardinal-Infante and not 
to the King of Spain was probably dictated by the casus belli and by the fact that the attack 
would begin in the Spanish Netherlands. By choosing this irregular course, they left some room 
for doubt whether they were really at war with the Spanish monarchy or were only taking limited 
action to liberate the Elector from the clutches of the Cardinal-Infante. There is no indication, 
however, that this was intended. What may have been intended is that France wanted to keep the 
option open that it was only fighting to aid an old ally, the Dutch, and wanted to limit its actions 
to the Netherlands.  
 Both the Cardinal-Infante’s and Philip IV’s declarations disputed the validity of the 
formal declaration of May 19, 1635. The Cardinal-Infante’s ministers stated that the declaration 
had not been presented in due form. First, they argued that the herald had not worn the proper 
insignia of his office. This was, if Gratiollet is to be believed, a lie. According to him, the 
Spanish had tried to convince him from the very start to lay down his insignia and thus 
jeopardize his position. He claimed not to have given in to that. Second, they wrote that the so-
called herald had not offered his credentials. The truth was that the Cardinal-Infante’s officials 
had gone out of their way not to accept anything. From the very beginning, they had been 
scheming – knowing what the French emissary had come to do – to invalidate his actions. The 
Spanish now laid the blame on the French King, who they said could not be trusted, because in 
the past a Frenchman had once abused the office of herald. By adding this far-fetched argument, 
they actually weakened their position as to the invalidity of the declaration. 
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 Philip IV’s text took another line of attack. Here it was argued that the declaration was 
void because it had not been addressed to the sovereign himself, but to one of his generals.213 It 
was said that the old Roman law demanded that a declaration was made to the Senate. It was true 
that in the Roman Republic, all foreign emissaries had to present their credentials to the proper 
magistrates and address the Senate, but power could be delegated to generals in the field.214 On 
the other hand, it was disputed whether the Romans could declare war at the first outpost of the 
enemy or whether they should address the declaration to the sovereign.215  
 The authors of the Spanish King’s declaration did not take the point any further. But was 
their position sustainable under the existing law of nations? Was there any support to be found in 
contemporary doctrine for the Spanish contention that only a declaration of war addressed to a 
sovereign was valid? Of the great writers on the law of nations of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, only the Italian jurist Pierino Belli (1502-1575) and the German jurist Johann 
Wolfgang Textor took a stand in this matter. Belli, who wrote in 1563, asserted that one who 
wanted to declare war on the subordinate of another should first seek redress from the overlord 
of his enemy.216 From there, one might argue that a fortiori a war could only be declared on a 
                                                 
213 The point was also raised by Guillén de la Carrera, one of the authors of the DECLARACION of Philips IV, in the 
treatise he wrote on the war of 1635; ALONSO GUILLÉN DE LA CARRERA, MANIFIESTO DE ESPAÑA Y FRANCIA 331, 
MADRID, National Library Ms. 2366, 218. See JOVER, supra note 15, at 259-60. 
214 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 105 (2001); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, vol. 1, 309-11 (1911). See also GROTIUS, 
supra note 99, 1.3.4.2. 
215 Ayala thought it could be addressed to any armed body of troops; Gentilis just mentioned that it was disputed 
whether a declaration to an outpost sufficed, with reference to Varro; AYALA, supra note 100, 1.1.5; GENTILIS, supra 
note 108, 2.1.210; see VARRO 5.86. 
216 PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS 1.5.6 (Herbert C. Nutting transl., Carnegie 1936) (1563). 
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sovereign by addressing the sovereign himself. Textor, in his 1680 Synopsis iuris gentium, stated 
it to be essential that the declaration of war should come to the knowledge of the head of State 
himself, or that it should be probable that the declaration would reach him. He accepted that, 
when there was no opportunity to deliver the declaration to the sovereign, it was issued to the 
nearest prefect or governor. Of course, this was cutting it both ways. Textor seemed to imply that 
as a rule the declaration should be issued to the sovereign, and that only if this was not possible, 
one could deflect from that rule. Moreover, Textor added that the ‘defendant’ should be allowed 
some interval to take note of the declaration.217 This seemed logical because the opposing party 
had to make it probable that the sovereign of his enemy would come to know of the declaration 
of war. Textor’s opinion at least makes it clear that the point the Spanish raised in 1635 should 
not have been considered moot all too readily. 
 Moreover, doctrine provided the Spanish with another, more indirect argument for their 
allegation. As it was widely accepted in contemporary doctrine, the declaration of war was a 
prerogative of the sovereign power within a realm. By consequence, there was logic in the 
argument that the same went for the right to accept a declaration and thus accept the state of war 
for one’s realm. Pierino Belli had sustained that a declaration of war against a sovereign 
extended to his associates and helpers.218 One could argue a contrario that the opposite was not 
true. Doctrine was not exactly clear on the matter. In any case, the authority to declare war and 
accept a declaration of war could be delegated. 219
                                                 
217 TEXTOR, supra note 13, 17.50-2. 
218 BELLI, supra note 216, 10.2.3 ; Grotius made a similar point, GROTIUS, supra note 99, 3.3.9. 
219 GROTIUS, supra note 99, 3.3.1.2. 
 86
 
 If one accepts the Spanish argument that only a sovereign can accept a declaration of war, 
the whole matter turns on the question whether the Cardinal-Infante had received a mandate from 
his elder brother to declare war by May 19. If he had the power to declare war by that day, it 
would become hard to argue that he had no power to accept a declaration. In the patent letters 
that accompanied his nomination to governor-general of the Netherlands, Philip IV had granted 
the Cardinal-Infante full powers to exercise royal authority in the Netherlands. The right to wage 
war, or make treaties, for that matter was not expressly mentioned, but it was not excluded 
either.220 But in his secret instructions of October 19, 1632, most of these powers had been 
limited and made conditional upon express permission of the King to take certain decisions. 
Accession to a treaty or the decision to go to war were among those.221 By May 19, 1635, the 
Cardinal-Infante had received no express permission to declare war upon France. As all this was 
common practice in Spanish politics; France would have a hard case to argue that it did not know 
about these limitations. In the case of peace negotiations, the Cardinal-Infante would certainly 
have to hand over full-powers for that particular negotiation before any power would agree to 
recognize his authority.222 However, the Cardinal-Infante did declare war on France in the name 
of his brother by means of his declaration of June 24, 1635. He claimed to do so on the basis of 
                                                 
220 Lettres patentes du 7 septembre 1633,  BRUSSELS, General Royal Archive, Papiers d’Etat et de l’Audience No. 
1619. 
221 The Cardinal-Infante did, however, not inform the French herald of that problem as he refused even to receive 
him. For the instruction, see SIMANCAS, Archivo General, Segretarías Provinciales No. 2569, 35. René Vermeir 
(University of Ghent) was so kind as to provide me with his transcription of this manuscript. 
222 For instance, in April 1635, the Cardinal-Infante had received full powers from his brother to represent Spain if 
talks about a general peace were to be held; Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, April 30, 1635, in BRUSSELS, 
General Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 212, 465. 
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the power he had received from his brother.223 It is not clear whether this was a new and express 
authorization, received after May 19, or not. The absence of an express authorization in the 
archives suggests the latter. If this is the case, the Cardinal-Infante’s declaration debilitates the 
whole Spanish case. One could argue that by this time the Spanish King had decided on all-out 
war against France and that the Cardinal-Infante acted under implicit permission of the King. 
The Cardinal-Infante for his part claimed to have received powers to declare war. But all this 
does little to take away the impression that the whole discussion was far fetched and legalistic to 
the point of becoming unrealistic.  
 Both the Spanish texts also pointed out that the declaration was made after the invasion 
of Spanish territory had begun. This was clearly in contravention to established doctrine. Where 
Grotius conceded that hostilities could commence the moment the war was declared, Pierino 
Belli and Gentilis demanded that a certain interval should be respected.224 The Brussels 
declaration made the most of this to show off the French King’s duplicity. First, the French 
invaded the Spanish Netherlands in such a way that they could always claim that the French 
troops were just auxiliaries sent to their allies in execution of certain treaty obligations.225 After 
his victory at Les Avins, King Louis XIII invoked the captivity of the Elector of Trier as a 
pretext and then declared war.226 These accusations only partially correspond with the facts. 
Gratiollet was in Brussels after the invasion had begun but before the Battle of Les Avins took 
                                                 
223 DECLARATION, 7. 
224 BELLI, supra note 216, 2.8.8; GENTILIS, supra note 108, 2.1.217-218, and GROTIUS, supra note 99, 3.3.13. 
225 The Alliance Treaty of April 15, 1634 between France and the Republic stipulated that France would provide a 
regiment of infantry and a company of cavalry to the Dutch army; Art. 5, DU MONT, supra note 15, vol. 6-1, 68. 
226 Juan Antonio Vincart, an official of the Spanish Secretariat for State and War in Brussels, repeated the same 
argument in his history of the 1635 campaign; HUISMAN, DHONDT AND VAN MEERBEECK, supra note 5, at 123. 
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place. But both the Cardinal-Infante’s and the King Philip’s ministers considered the anteriority 
of the invasion to the declaration proof of the French King’s duplicity and of the invalidity of the 
declaration of war. Doctrine indeed stated that one could not declare war after one had started 
it.227
 From all this it can be deduced that the belligerents of 1635 thought an express 
declaration of war was necessary for the state of war to begin. But to conclude that it should be a 
declaration by herald as was done by the French in 1635 would be stretching it too far. By 1635, 
this form had fallen into disuse; the declaration by herald of May 19 of that year was highly 
exceptional. However, some form of declaration seemed to be in order. The most common form 
during the seventeenth century consisted in a declaration by a residing diplomat and an official 
publication of a declaration like that of Louis XIII of June 6, 1635 and that of the Cardinal-
Infante of June 24, 1635. In addition to offering justifications for the war, these declarations also 
announced that a state of war existed. Like the declarations of 1635, these texts often comprised 
the measures to be taken against enemy subjects and property as well as a prohibition of all 
                                                 
227 Richard Stradling suggested that the fact that France had first declared war after it had opened the hostilities 
justified the confiscation of all French assets on Spanish territory; Stradling, supra note 58, at 93. This seems to 
imply that France, because of its defective declaration, could not benefit from the protection of the ius in bello. The 
argument is void because the ius in bello anyhow allowed the confiscation of all enemy property, that is if a prior 
treaty had not excluded this; ANDREAS F. SONNTAG, DIE BEHANDLUNG FEINDLICHEN PRIVATEIGENTUMS BEI 
AUSBRUCH DES KRIEGES INNERHALB DER EIGENEN GRENZEN IN DER ZEIT VON 1200 BIS 1800. EIN BEITRAG ZUR 
VÖLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTE 45-6 (1990). See AYALA, supra note 100, 1.5.1; BELLI, supra note 216, 2.12.1; 
CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLIC LIBRI DUO 1.7.51-52 (Tenny Frank, transl., Carnegie 
1930) (1737); GENTILIS, supra note 108, 3.7; GROTIUS, supra note 99, 3.6.1-2. In any case, the French King Louis 
XIII had been preparing for a similar confiscation of Spanish property even before May 19, 1635; Lettre du Roy au 
Parlement, pour arrester les biens des Espagnols, May 16, 1635, in 67 GAZETTE DE FRANCE 275 (1635). 
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communications and commerce with the enemy. But it was not implied in 1635, nor does it 
appear from the ensuing war, that the nullity of a declaration prevented the laws of war to apply 
and supersede the laws of peace, as doctrine would have it. In reality, there were no sanctions 
attached to a faulty declaration of war. Anyhow, in the 1635 case the question was of little 
practical significance as the French King issued a second declaration on June 6 and the Cardinal-
Infante reciprocated with a Spanish declaration on June 24. After that, no party could – or ever 
did – dispute that there was a state of war between France and Spain. The Spanish rejection of 
the validity of the declaration of May 19, 1635 served a political, and not a juridical purpose. It 
was yet another way of showing the world the falseness of the French.  
 
 
The justice of the war 
 
Arguing the justice – or in modern terms, the legitimacy – of the war was, however, a far greater 
concern to the parties. For political reasons, both belligerents wanted to convince their allies and 
subjects of the justice of the war. Another possible purpose of the declarations, which the 
Spanish certainly contemplated,228 was to convince allies and subjects of the enemy of the 
injustice of the war fought by their sovereign or ally. But while the belligerent’s purposes were 
political, they argued their case in terms of the traditional rules of the just war and the ius ad 
bellum. They frequently used the terms ‘just,’ ‘justice,’ ‘unjust,’ ‘injustice,’ and, less frequently, 
‘righteous.’ They did not distinguish between moral and legal arguments, nor did they between 
natural or positive law, as Grotius did. These dimensions all remained inextricably intertwined 
                                                 
228 ELLIOTT, supra note 45, at 489. 
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with one another. Therefore, it would be an anachronism to ban the debate on the justice of the 
war outside the sphere of law to that of morality or politics. To the authors of the declarations it 
was, among others, very much a matter of law – just as it was to the great scholars of the era to 
whom it was a matter of natural law, being the highest and most self-imposing form of law. 
. How does the state practice as it appears from the declarations relate to Grotius’ claim 
that subjects and allies had the right to abandon their sovereign or ally if they thought his cause 
unjust? The four texts show that both the belligerents allowed for the possibility that the allies 
and subjects would abandon their side. The declarations were made to prevent their own allies 
and subjects from doing so and provoke such behavior with those of the enemy. But what legal 
rules underlay their practices? From both Kings’ declarations, it can be surmised that they 
accepted that allies and subjects could abandon an unjust cause. But whether the allies and 
subjects were allowed, as Grotius suggested, to follow their own judgment on the justice of the 
cause, was a question left unaddressed. Both parties thought their cause manifestly just and were 
certain their allies and subjects would acknowledge this. It was beyond doubt that the enemy’s 
cause was objectively unjust, so that his allies and subjects had a right, not a duty, to abandon 
him. Seventeenth-century peace treaty practice furthermore showed that if an ally had invoked 
the injustice of a war and changed sides, the duped powers would protest but otherwise, even 
when victorious, never press the point in a peace treaty. Rebelling subjects were another matter. 
Their right to judge on the actions of their prince was not recognized by their own prince. So in 
fact, allowing for the difference in scope between a scholar who wants to clarify the law and a 
king who wants to use it for his own opportunistic ends without caring about it being 
consequential or clear, Grotius’ theory was remarkably in accordance with state practice as far as 
allies were concerned. Regarding subjects, his claim that they could themselves judge on the 
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justice of the cause of their prince was treated according to the dictates of expediency. Own 
subjects could not judge themselves; the enemy’s could not but acknowledge that their prince’s 
war was – objectively – unjust. 
 
 
The casus belli: Self-defense and the defense of allies 
 
According to traditional doctrine, for a war to be just it needed a just cause. Generally speaking, 
in early-modern as in medieval doctrine, a war could only be just if its constituted a reaction to a 
prior injustice committed by the enemy. 
 Both belligerents listed many wrongs they had suffered over an lengthy period of time. 
But only some of those translated into just causes. The French invoked the attack on Trier, the 
capture of the Elector of Trier, and the refusal to set him free as their casus belli. The war was 
just on their side because it was declared and fought in defense of an ally who had been unjustly 
wronged by the Spanish and whom the King of France was obliged to protect by treaty. 
 First, it must be pointed out that the French did not base their case on the fact that 
Spanish troops had attacked the French garrison at Trier and thus had opened hostilities between 
the armies. They did not even refer to that fact. The attack on the French garrison on March 26, 
1635 was certainly not the first clash between French and Spanish troops. Two years earlier, the 
French had driven the Spanish garrison out of that same town. As the leaders of both great 
powers had been trying to postpone the war for years, they had never before considered such 
actions a reason for all-out war. As long as such things happened outside the territories of the 
two Kings themselves, they were content to catalogue them as covert war. In the light of 
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contemporary doctrine, one could make the argument that these were considered limited actions 
– of self-defense? –, that did not trigger or constitute actual war. What Louis XIII invoked as the 
casus belli was the attack on the person of his ally. That act in itself was called an infringement 
of ‘the law of nations’ (droict des gens) – the only time that term was used in the French texts – 
and it was an infringement of the sovereign rights of a prince of the Empire. For this act he 
claimed the just cause of defending an ally. One could also consider it an act of restitution or 
revindication of an ally against an injury committed by the enemy. 
 Second, the Spanish did not dispute the right to wage a defensive war on behalf of an 
ally. But they did dispute the French interpretation of the facts and circumstances of the case 
itself. Primo, they disputed the capacity of the French King as protector of the Elector. In their 
view, the Emperor was his first protector. The Spanish King, as Duke of Luxemburg, was the 
protector of the town of Trier. The French had argued that Louis XIII had had to extend his 
protection to the Elector because nobody else was capable. The Spanish did not deign to answer. 
Secundo, the Cardinal-Infante’s action was justified because he had liberated the Elector from 
French oppression. Tertio, all disputes concerning the Elector and town of Trier fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Emperor, on whose behalf the Spanish acted. The French had no right to 
intervene in the matters of the Empire and the Elector’s position did not concern ‘all princes of 
Christianity’ as the French said. Here a fundamental difference of opinion existed between the 
Spanish and the Emperor on one side and the French on the other side about the measure of 
‘liberty’ and ‘sovereignty’ of the princes and estates of the Empire in general and, more 
particularly, their right to make treaties of alliance with foreign powers. That would only be 
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solved at the Peace Treaties of Westphalia in 1648.229 In this context, the Cardinal-Infante in his 
Declaration had it stated that all measures taken against the Elector were covered by imperial 
authority. That was a lie in so far as his abduction on March 26, was concerned. It was only 
afterwards that the Cardinal-Infante tried to obtain a sanction for his rash deed from the 
Emperor,230 and even from the Pope.231 Quarto, in as far as the French King had anything to 
demand, he had to await the reply and the decisions taken by the Emperor and the King of Spain 
before declaring war. Refraining from doing so was against ‘the law and usages of war.’232
 By rejecting the French casus belli, the Spanish could claim that the French invasion of 
the Spanish Netherlands was an unjust attack. They thus justified the war as defensive on their 
part. To the invasion and atrocities against the Netherlands, they could add the operations of 
Rohan against the Spanish troops in the Valtelline from April 1635 onwards. Under traditional 
doctrine, the Spanish could have refrained from declaring war themselves and just acted under 
the umbrella of the natural right of self-defense. Through the declaration by the Cardinal-Infante, 
                                                 
229 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Der westfälische Frieden und das Bündnissrecht der Reichsstände, 8 DER STAAT 
449 (1969); DEREK CROXTON, PEACEMAKING IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: CARDINAL MAZARIN AND THE CONGRESS 
OF WESTPHALIA 1643-1648 (1999); DICKMANN, supra note 38, at 124-63. The French pressed for the recognition 
and extension of this right to most German princes: Ronald G. Asch, The ius foederis Re-examined: The Peace of 
Westphalia and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, in PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE 319 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004). 
230 After his abduction, the Elector was accused of rebellion against the Emperor and the Spanish King, of 
witchcraft, and of atheism; Letter of Stravius to Barberini, April 7, 1635, supra note 2, at 59. In April 1635, the 
Emperor had it been known that he had not ordered the arrest of the Elector; VERMEIR, supra note 68, at 115. 
231 Letter of Stravius to Barberini, April 21, 1635, supra note 2, at 62. See also Letter of the Cardinal-Infante to 
Philip IV of April 1, 1635, BRUSSELS, General Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 212, 370-1. 
232 Supra note 189. 
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the Spanish however recognized that a state of war existed between France and Spain. Their 
actions of self-defense, which allowed only for a limited and proportional military response as 
long as the attack was going on, was thus turned into a full defensive war, which was unlimited 
in scope and duration and triggered the application of the laws of war, including the right to 
make booty and conquests. The Cardinal-Infante’s declaration thus reflects the traditional, 
doctrinal distinction between actions in self-defense – limited in goal and scope – and defensive 
warfare. 
 Both parties thus claimed to wage a defensive war: France in defense of or retribution for 
an ally, Spain in self-defense against an unjust attack. Both argued that the casus belli – the 
capture of the Elector in the French case and the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in the 
Spanish case – was just the last in a long series of offenses against themselves and their allies. In 
this way, both indirectly invoked self-defense and defense of their allies as a more fundamental 
just cause for the war and accepted such a right to exist. 
 
 
Preemptive self- defense 
 
 The French invoked a second cause for the war. They claimed that the decision to declare 
war and invade the Spanish Netherlands was taken because they had been informed of the 
Spanish plans to invade France. The war was an act of – in present-day terminology – 
preemptive self-defense against an imminent attack. In the thought of Gentilis and Grotius, this 
fell within the boundaries of defensive war. The French stated that their invading army had 
intercepted the Spanish army under Thomas of Savoy on its way to the French border. This was, 
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however, not its destination. The Spanish corps had been on its way to the Rhineland. 
Notwithstanding this, it was not unreasonable for the French government to fear a Spanish 
invasion in the near future. The Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean was being prepared, plans for 
a multiple attack had been entertained in Spanish government circles, and  Spain had been 
pressuring the Emperor for months to declare war on France. Still, there was little proof that an 
attack was imminent and the argument had all the likeliness of a pretext.233  
 It is puzzling why Paris invoked this second just cause, which was much shakier than the 
first. There are two reasons for this move. First, it can be presumed that they felt that the 
abduction of the Elector of Trier was not enough to justify the decision to start an all-out war 
with Spain. After all, that offense was surely not much graver than many others they allegedly 
suffered in the past and thus, even to the French, it might have appeared as something of a 
pretext. It was not the abduction of the Elector of Trier that made the French plot and prepare a 
war for 1635, but the Swedish defeat at Nördlingen and the fear of losing their allies. The events 
of March 26, only decided the timing and justification of the attack. As it was pointed out above, 
Louis XIII and Richelieu could not allow themselves to abandon an ally when so many of their 
allies where thinking about doing just that. Also, Trier may have convinced Louis XIII and 
Richelieu that it was time to attack before they were attacked. If that is true, the French rulers 
were not less honest or more dishonest in making the case of preemptive action than in invoking 
                                                 
233 The Cardinal-Infante himself was also fearful for some time of a French attack on the Spanish Netherlands; 
Letters from the Cardinal-Infante to the Count of Oñate of April 29, 1635 and May 11, 1635, BRUSSELS, General 
Royal Archive, Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre No. 334, 208 and 233. 
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the Elector’s plight.234 Second, the French rulers had something more to explain than the 
decision to declare war on Spain; namely, the invasion and possible future conquest of the 
Spanish Netherlands. That the war was an action to help and liberate the Elector of Trier, who 
was held captive in the Netherlands, was surely an argument to invade that part of the Spanish 
empire. But the fact that the Spanish army was plotting to attack France from these same lands, 
strengthened the case for first starting the war there. On the other hand, the argument of 
preemption did not serve to cover the most embarrassing aspect to the whole case for the French. 
The French-Dutch attack of May 1635 was not the result of a sudden decision, but had been 
plotted over a long period of time. In fact, it had been agreed on in the Treaty of February 8, 
1635. A future occupation or annexation of parts of the Spanish Netherlands could thus hardly be 
explained away as the outcome of a war forced upon the Spanish by their imminent attack. It had 
to be justified on its own terms. 
 
 
Assistance to an oppressed people and to a rebellion 
 
To do this, the French invoked yet another cause. The authors of the Declaration du Roy of June 
6 stated that the joint Franco-Dutch invasion of the Spanish Netherlands was the first operation 
of the war because the population there had been suffering for so long under Spanish ‘servitude’ 
and the war against Spain.235 On this point, the Declaration closely followed the Franco-Dutch 
                                                 
234 Current international lawyers might raise the question whether the war was a proportionate reaction to the 
enemy’s offense. At no point in the declarations, the authors of 1635 gave voice to such a concern, but it played an 
implicit role in relation to the question whether the war was necessary. 
235 DECLARACION, 26. 
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Alliance of February 8, 1635. It repeated the treaty text by explaining that those parts of the 
Spanish Netherlands that liberated themselves from the Spanish within two months after the 
Declaration would be recognized as free states and would enjoy the protection of France.  
 Thus, the just causes of assistance to an oppressed people and of aid to a rebellion – 
causes that several of the leading authors of the period accepted – were invoked. The fact that the 
rebellion in the Spanish Netherlands had not started yet could be swept from the table with the 
argument that the rebellion had been going on for sixty-seven years, ever since the rebellion of 
the Netherlands from which the Dutch Republic was born began in 1568. This argument lay 
dormant in the reference to the longevity of the war in the Netherlands. 
  
 
A necessary war and a just goal 
 
Under the classical just war doctrine of the Late Middle Ages, for a war to be just three 
conditions had to be met. First, it had to be waged by a sovereign. Second, it had to be fought for 
a just cause and, third, the belligerent must have a righteous intention and pursue a just goal. The 
third condition was predominantly of a moral dimension. It had its roots in Christian theology. In 
the Thomist tradition, it implied that the belligerent had to strive for the common good.236 The 
war should not only be about the enforcement of the belligerent’s own rights and the pursuance 
of his own legitimate interest. It had to be waged to attain a just peace whereby everybody 
received his due. Once the medieval system of the respublica christiana had collapsed and the 
law of nations had started to emancipate from the scholastic context, this third condition became 
                                                 
236 PHILIPPE CONTAMINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 286 (1984). 
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even more unenforceable than before. But the great writers of the law of nations of the sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries stuck to it and restated it in one form or another in their 
interpretations of the just war. Students of the history of the medieval and modern law of nations 
have struggled with that third condition and treated it with certain unease. By and large, the 
juridical mind has experienced a hard time to take it serious. What did a just goal mean in terms 
of legal rules? 
 The men who wrote the four declarations of 1635 had no such difficulties or scruples. As 
was expounded above, the French and the Spanish both invoked just causes. But for them, these 
did not suffice to justify an all-out war. In the final analysis, it was the just goal combined with 
the fact that the war was necessary to attain that goal that truly justified it.237 This was done 
through drawing the bigger picture against the background of which the casus belli had to be 
seen. The greater parts of the four declarations were not devoted to the casus belli that directly 
caused the war, but to sketching that bigger picture.  
 The four declarations of 1635 all betray unease with the casus belli the belligerents 
appealed too. The abduction of the Elector of Trier by the Spanish surely presented the French 
with an argument for just cause, but it did not truly explain why France, after so many years of 
covert war and so many other offenses, now decided upon an open and all-out war. The claim 
that France’s war against and invasion of the Spanish Netherlands was a defensive reaction 
against an imminent attack by Spain was not exactly true, but France had some reason to fear an 
invasion. The aid to an oppressed people may have been good propaganda, but would probable 
                                                 
237 Piirimäe, in his analysis of the manifesto issued by Gustav Adolph of Sweden at the occasion of his invasion of 
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not withstand the test of reality as an actual uprising in the Spanish Netherlands was highly 
uncertain. And above all, these arguments did not answer the accusation that the invasion of the 
Netherlands had been agreed to with the Dutch Republic in an offensive alliance treaty of early 
February 1635, in which France finally accepted a proposal the Dutch had already made to them 
in the spring of 1634.238 When this treaty became known to the Spanish, France felt caught in the 
light. It needed more than the three just causes mentioned. The same went for what the French 
and Dutch had in store for the contingency of the local population of the Spanish Netherlands did 
not rise: the division and  annexation of those territories. From Richelieu’s advice of June 1634, 
in which he argued against a joint Franco-Dutch conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, it is 
known that Richelieu was not keen on making such a move and was concerned with the fact that 
it would damage France’s reputation. France could not invoke any dynastical claims or other 
legal rights to the Spanish Netherlands, something the Cardinal-Minister had always seen to with 
great care in sustaining the other territorial claims of his King.239 The Spanish had a similar 
problem. Their just cause – self-defense against an unprovoked and unjust French invasion – 
stood or fell with the acceptance of their interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Emperor and the 
Spanish King over the Elector of Trier, which was much disputed, and their reading of the events 
of March 26, 1635, which was neither clear nor credible. 
 Necessity and expediency provided the answer to these problems. In this, state practice 
followed doctrine. The great writers of the law of nations from the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries all had adopted the medieval phraseology on the righteousness of 
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intentions and goals. Without a just goal, even a just cause did not suffice for a war to be 
acceptable. While seemingly sustaining the medieval tradition, the forefathers of the modern law 
of nations adapted it to the exigencies of the newly emerging sovereign powers. The 
emancipation of the law of nations from theology, Christian morality, and scholastic authority 
robbed the moral dimension of much of its real substance. The ‘just goal’ began, very gradually, 
to mutate from a moral into a political category – a process only completed in the eighteenth 
century. Arguments of necessity and expediency slipped in. Grotius, for instance, argued that 
because war was a dangerous undertaking, one should only wage war out of necessity or/and at 
the most opportune moment.240 War was wise and just if the benefits were likely to be larger 
than the costs. It should always be the very last resort, and everything that could be done to avoid 
it had to be tried first.241 To Grotius and his predecessors, this line of argument served as the 
ultimate means of deterring princes from waging war. But in doing so, they, most probably 
unwillingly, allowed political deliberations to interplay with juridical and moral arguments and 
gain a foothold in the just war doctrine. 
 In the four declarations of 1635, the argument of necessity, and of expediency, played a 
part in two different ways. First, the incessant offenses the enemy had committed against the 
King, his subjects, allies, and friends over the preceding two decades made the war inevitable. 
Large tracts of the four treatises were devoted to listing the misdeeds the King had patiently 
suffered for such a long time. The enemy, so both parties stated, had corrupted the peace and had 
made it more costly to the King, his subjects, and allies than war itself. The French declaration of 
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June 6, 1635 put it most eloquently. Why keep a peace that cost 150,000 men to guard it and 
depleted the French treasury while the Spanish grew stronger?242 War was thus the responsible 
act of a patient and just king, who could no longer condone that his people and allies suffered 
from his moral scruples. For current international lawyers, this reasoning would also answer the 
question of proportionality. The decision to start all-out war was no disproportionate reaction to 
an isolated offense. But the declarations of 1635 left it understated; neither was the terminology 
used nor was the question expressly addressed. But it was in accordance with the exhortations of 
Grotius and the proponents of the classical just war doctrine not to wage war unless there was no 
alternative left and the good that would come from it would outweigh the evil.243
 Second, the war was necessary to attain the belligerents’ just goal: a firm, just, and stable 
peace. In stating this, the authors of the 1635 declarations replaced themselves in the age-old 
tradition of the just war. Firm, just, and stable peace was further qualified; it was identified with 
the achievement of the long-term strategy and goals of the own monarchy. It was Pax Hispanica 
to the Spanish, and Pax Gallica to the French. 
 The French styled themselves as the champions of ‘public liberty’ and ‘public peace’ in 
Europe. The Spanish Kings were accused of aspiring to universal monarchy. French power was 
the only thing that stood between Spain and the achievement of that goal. Therefore, the 
enhancement of the power of France and the abasement of Spain became just goals themselves. 
 Universal monarchy was an old concept that drew on a long tradition, dating back to the 
Roman Empire, Charlemagne (768-814), and the heyday of the Holy Roman Empire in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. The claims of the Emperor to universal monarchy had been 
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consistently rejected by the Pope and the kings of Western Europe since the early thirteenth 
century,244 but the idea had lived on. With the election of Charles V of Habsburg, who was also 
King of Spain and lord of the Netherlands, to the imperial throne in 1519, the ideal went through 
a brief revival. But by the 1540s, Charles V’s all in all half-hearted attempts to establish his 
authority over Western Europe had been thwarted by a coalition of France, the German 
Protestant princes, and the Turks. When he abdicated in 1555/1556, Charles split his empire 
between his son Philip II, who inherited Spain, the Netherlands, and the Italian possessions of 
Spain, and his brother Ferdinand I (1530-1564), who continued to rule in Austria, Bohemia, and 
Hungary, and became Emperor. A lasting result of this episode was that Spain, and not the Holy 
Roman Empire, became the seat of true ‘empire’ in the Latin West.245 From the days of Charles 
V on, France, which had been the greatest contender of Charles V and later of Spain for the 
leading position in Europe, used the rhetoric of universal monarchy against Spain to establish 
itself as the champion of liberty. 
 In the old medieval and sixteenth-century tradition, universal monarchy did not imply the 
submission annexation of and direct rule over all kingdoms of the Latin West. It was a 
combination of factual hegemony and legal precedence. In the medieval ideology of empire, the 
Emperor was the secular head of Christianity, as the Pope was the spiritual leader. He was the 
first among kings. Since the tenth century, the imperial crown had been linked to the crowns of 
the Kingdoms of Germany and Italy – that is, Italy north of Rome. The Emperor took precedence 
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over all other kings, but could not claim to rule them. His main ‘authority’ was vested in his 
capacity of defender of the faith and protector of the Pope. He was the military arm of the 
Church. He had to lead the Latin West in its fight against infidels and heretics. The recognition 
as leader of a crusade by other kings was therefore the ultimate symbol of universal monarchy. 
The Emperor also had to protect the worldly possessions of the Church, such as the Papal State 
around Rome and could, if necessary, correct the Pope and the clergy if they diverted from the 
true path. Few of the Emperors from Otto the Great (936-973) to Charles V had succeeded in 
having these claims accepted by the Pope and other kings of the West.246
 Richelieu and his circle revived the concept of universal monarchy to turn it against the 
Spanish. In its role as the defender of the freedom of all European princes against Spain’s 
insatiable lust for domination, France found the way to identifying its own interest and strategy 
with the common interest of Europe: public liberty and peace.  
 Richelieu did not aspire to territorial expansion for its own sake. He was very much 
aware that this would destroy France’s self-declared status as the champion of the sovereignty of 
all princes and, therefore, he was careful to pursue only those territorial claims for which a 
credible legal basis could be found or construed.247 His policy was not one of ‘natural frontiers,’ 
as it has been claimed. Richelieu wanted to obtain some strategic fortresses in west Germany and 
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Italy that would at the same time give France an east-west entrance into these lands and cut the 
north-south-route of the Spanish monarchy. He aspired to ‘natural gateways’, not ‘natural 
frontiers.’248 This would allow France to break the Habsburg encirclement of France and cut the 
lifeline of the Spanish empire, the Spanish Road. This would bestow upon France the capacity to 
intervene diplomatically and military in Germany and Italy, to break Spanish hegemony there, 
and keep those lands divided. Thus Germany, Italy, and, in the final analysis, France and the 
whole of Europe, would be free from Spanish oppression. 
 In historiography, Richelieu has often been depicted as an early incarnation of the 
ideology of ‘reason of state.’ According to this ideology, the interests of the state were the 
determinant factor in international and internal politics and overruled all consideration of ethics 
or religion. As such, it was the consummation of the secularization of politics and was a 
necessary forerunner of an international order of sovereign states. In his seminal Diplomacy of 
1994, Henry Kissinger pitted Richelieu against the Emperor Ferdinand II. Whereas the Emperor 
fought to save the old religious order of Europe, Richelieu is styled as the forefather of the 
modern states system.249  
 Of course, Richelieu worked for the aggrandizement of his King and country and placed 
their interests above all. But his idea of ‘reason of state’ was not a secular one and did not differ 
much of that of the Habsburg leaders, Ferdinand II, Philip IV, or Olivares. Like these men, 
Richelieu was a deeply religious man who tried to align his King’s interests with that of the faith 
and the Church. The solution lay not in suppressing the common interests of Christianity and 
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upholding the interests of the King, but in the reciprocal identification of both. In the minds of 
Richelieu and even more of Father Joseph, France was the bedrock of Christianity and 
Catholicism. King Clovis of the Franks (481-511) was the first of the Germanic kings to have 
accepted the faith of Rome (496). The French Kings were the true heirs of Charlemagne and with 
Louis IX (1226-1270) held a second saint among their ancestors. Since almost two centuries, 
they had proudly carried the title of ‘Most Christian King.’250 Their resistance against the 
Spanish lust for domination was also a fight for the Catholic Church and the faith, which was as 
much oppressed by the Spanish as the princes of Europe were. 
 What kind of ‘just peace’ did France aspire to? What was the European order the war had 
to make possible? The keywords of this order, the Pax Gallica, were ‘public liberty’ and 
‘equality.’ France’s war was a fight for ‘public liberty,’ freedom for all. It was a fight to protect 
the princes and republics outside the Holy Roman Empire against Spain’s desire for universal 
monarchy. It was a fight to protect the constitutional rights and liberties of the princes and estates 
of the Empire against the attempts of the Austrian Habsburgs to transform the Empire into a 
‘hereditary monarchy.’ And, lastly, it was a fight for the liberty of the Church.251 Spain wanted 
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nothing less than to use the Church as an instrument of power and oppress it. The Pope as the 
secular leader of the Papal State, who was an objective ally of France at the time, was yet another 
victim of Spain’s domination over Italy. More equality among the European princes would allow 
the Church to be free. Only through ‘their [the princes’] equality, the Church can survive and 
maintain itself in all its functions and splendor,’ Richelieu wrote.252
 Equality was a prerequisite for ‘liberty,’ and not only for the Church. It was a prerequisite 
for ‘public liberty’ for all. No power could be allowed to be or become so powerful that it could 
threaten the liberty and sovereignty of others. This meant that no power could be greater than 
France, the traditional defender of the weak and the champion of public liberty. Therefore, Spain 
and its Austrian allies needed to be cut down to size.  
 Italy and Germany had to remain divided. After all, he who dominated these lands, 
dominated Europe. The religious divide between Catholics and Protestants could only add to 
public liberty, although this was a difficult point for the Cardinal-Minister and his King. 
However, as it was repeatedly stated in the declarations of 1635, Spain’s claim to championing 
the cause of Catholicism was nothing but a sham to push for domination, to keep the Catholic 
princes in line and conquer the Protestants. It would be better for Europe if Spain no longer was 
the leading Catholic power. There would be greater protection for the Church in the equality of 
the princes than in Spanish domination, which provoked the Protestants and suppressed the 
catholics. For years, Richelieu and Father Joseph had appealed to the Catholic princes of the 
Empire to side with France and save their religion without sacrificing their liberty. It remained 
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understated that under such a peace and with such ‘equality,’ France would become the true 
power broker of Europe and effectively the hegemonic power. 
 To attain all this, Spain’s position, as it had existed before 1618 in Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, had to be broken. This in essence offensive long-term strategy was sincerely 
proposed as being a defensive strategy. This was done on the basis of the allegation that Spain 
aspired to universal monarchy.  
 All this made the war necessary, inevitable, and just. France’s noble aims and Spain’s 
wickedness forced the war upon Louis XIII. France might want to change the status quo and 
break Spain’s preexisting position, but it was forced to do so because of the continuous and 
unjust actions of Spain, which sought expansion and the suppression of all. After all, Spain’s 
existing empire was but the result of its age-long and unjust lust for expansion and domination. 
This rhetoric turned France’s strategy from offensive into defensive. In this sense, the war, even 
the premeditated invasion and conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, became an action that was 
cloaked under what could be called ‘hegemonic defense’ or ‘hegemonic strategic defense.’ This 
essentially defensive position made even the most offensive deeds look like just reactions to the 
enemy’s injustice. The invasion and conquest of the Spanish Netherlands was necessary because 
these lands for too long had served as the basis from which Spain launched its attacks on France 
and the Republic and plotted the submission of Europe.253
 In short, the declarations of 1635 did nothing but restate what Richelieu had already 
proposed in his famous advice of 1629: 
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 Concerning foreign policy, we need to be constantly worried about stopping the rise of 
Spain and, unlike this nation, whose goal it is to enhance its domination and expand its 
borders, France must only think about fortifying itself and build and open gateways to 
enter the states of its neighbors in order to be able to save them from the oppression of 
Spain when the moment arises.254
 
The writers Olivares and the Cardinal-Infante hired to state their case in 1635 used a very similar 
notion of ‘hegemonic defense.’ In fact, they had an easier task in this. Olivares’ long-term goals 
did not include territorial expansion or the oppression of the Latin West. Under his rule, Spain 
aspired to nothing but the status quo ante of the years before the Bohemian rebellion, with the 
exception of obtaining better peace conditions of the Dutch. While this was found oppressive by 
many of Spain’s enemies and allies, Olivares did not see it in this light. In his eyes, his goal was 
the defense of the monarchy and the upholding of the reputation of his King. This meant that 
Spain would not lose any territory, would press its rightful dynastic claims, and defend the 
authority of the Emperor in Germany and Northern Italy. Also, Spain saw itself as the champion 
of the Catholic faith and the Church. As the leading power in Italy, it was in a position to play 
that role vis-à-vis the Pope. It had been waging a war against the Dutch heretics for the better 
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part of a century and had always fought for the cause of the faith in the Empire. In its eyes, the 
Contra-Reformation was not aggression but taking back of what had unjustly been taken away.  
 This conviction of the defensive character of Spain’s grand strategy was for Olivares, as 
it was for Richelieu, a strong argument to persuade himself of the justness and essentially 
defensive nature of even his most offensive actions.255 According to the declarations of 1635, the 
war was just because it envisaged nothing but the restoration of the just peace Spain had secured 
before 1618, the Pax Hispanica. The war against France was necessary because it was the only 
thing that would stop France from attacking Spain and its Catholic allies and from constantly 
disturbing the peace. A stable peace would have to be forced upon France. This in itself justified 
a war and all offensive actions that went along with it.256
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: HEGEMONIC DEFENSE 
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 What customary rules on the ius ad bellum emerge from this analysis of the Spanish and 
French declarations of 1635? What was the ius ad bellum in their eyes? Of course, the practices, 
even of the mightiest states, may as well be infringements of the law as they may reflect or 
constitute it. But at a time when the ius ad bellum was not codified and doctrine had lost much of 
its authority, the sovereigns of Europe were more than ever thrown upon their own devices to 
state the law. Doctrine was still an important source of inspiration, but it had lost its conclusive 
authority. States could and would deflect from what the law said and not be sanctioned for it. In 
such a system of law, the law of nations was just that: the law of nations. That is not to say that 
the law was what ‘nations’ made of it. It was what they made of it and could get away with in the 
eyes of their peers. For this law, or at least for what states perceived it to be, the propagandistic 
justifications of war are a primary source. 
 The writers of 1635 adhered to the established doctrine of the early seventeenth century, 
with its distinction between legal and just war. They thought that war had to be formally declared 
for the state of war legally to begin and the laws of war to supersede the laws of peace. However, 
there was no sanction but the infamy of duplicity not to do so. But much more important than 
that, war had to be just. At no point, the texts expressly stated that war was the domain of public 
authorities which recognized no higher authority, but it is absolutely certain that the French and 
Spanish would agree with that view – the debate on the rights of the imperial estates left aside. 
For a war to be just, one needed a just cause. It was not disputed that self-defense and the 
defense of allies counted among the just causes. France invoked the right of, in modern terms, 
preemptive self-defense to forestall an imminent Spanish invasion. The French also claimed the 
right to intervene against a monarch suppressing his own people as a just cause. The Spanish 
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only reacted to this by calling the Dutch rebels and heretics. They certainly agreed with Ayala 
that no prince had the right to intervene on their side. 
 But while contemporary doctrine and subsequent historiography have devoted most of 
their attention to the causes of war, the authors of 1635 stressed the justice of their goals. There 
lay the conclusive evidence for the justice of their behavior. War had to be prevented at all costs, 
except the cost of the vital interests of the King, his subjects and allies. War was just because it 
was necessary to safeguard these vital interests and to achieve the ultimate, just goal of the King: 
a firm, stable, and just peace. That peace would benefit the whole Christian West. But the 
interests of the whole were equaled to the interests of the just belligerent. The own grand strategy 
was veiled with the cloak of the common good. For both powers, this strategy was essentially 
defensive. It was defense, upholding, or retaking of what was rightfully theirs. In this pursuit of 
their own interests lay the accomplishment of their responsibility as a leading power for the 
peace and interest of Europe and of religion. 
 This notion can be called ‘hegemonic strategic defense’ or just ‘hegemonic defense.’ I 
will use the shorter term. In historical and in current doctrine of international law, ‘self-defense’ 
refers to the cause for war. It defines and characterizes military actions. A war is defensive when 
it is waged to stop or preempt an armed attack by the enemy. States are expected to argue their 
appeal to defense on a tactical or operational level. But as it appears from the practice of 1635, 
‘defense’ in the hands of political leaders puts on another appearance. They appeal to ‘defense’ 
employing arguments of political strategy. The men of 1635 used and abused the notion of ‘just 
goal’ from the classical just war doctrine to slip in their political strategy and cover it with law 
and morals. As such, their grand strategy became undisputedly just in their own eyes and, 
therefore, all operational decisions that served this higher purpose shared in its justice. As that 
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higher purpose was defense of the international order they stood for, even the most offensive 
operations became essentially defensive. As such, the borderlines between reactive defense, 
anticipatory self-defense, and even outright aggression were fatally blurred. The intellectual 
process allowing for this was the identification of the own vital interests with the common good 
and the rightful state of affairs – to be defended or achieved – of the whole international order. 
This was termed a just and stable peace. Each attack on the interests of the power concerned was 
unjust because these interests converged with international order and peace. However, each 
attack constituted an attack on international order and peace. Each action that prevented the 
power concerned to uphold or restore or attain that order, was an act of aggression against that 
order and against peace. It gave that power the right to defend the order of Europe in a just war. 
The identification of self-interest with international order and peace promoted that power to the 
safeguard of that order and allowed it to define and fight off all threats to it.  
 The case of 1635 clearly illustrates how political interest slid into a doctrine that was 
largely medieval, legal, and moral. The forefathers of the early-modern law of nations had the 
best moral intentions in paying lip service to the classical just war doctrine and in upholding its 
third condition. But even they had opened the gate to the political by allowing in notions of 
necessity and expediency. This became the gate through which political arguments flooded in. 
While the scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had stuck with the third condition 
of Aquinas – righteous intention or just goal – ultimately to prevent war, even when there was 
just cause, state practice turned this logic on itself. ‘Just goal’ and necessity of war to attain that 
goal in their hands were no additional conditions; they were conditions that could even sanction 
an unjust cause – even if that was not yet admitted.257 This process would be accomplished 
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halfway the eighteenth century when ‘political interest’ became a sufficient cause as well as goal 
in state practice. Wars were then simply justified in terms of goals, which served as cause at the 
same time.258
 It remains extremely hard to judge which of the belligerents had the stronger case in 
terms of the then existing law. The Cardinal-Infante’s rash actions against Trier, which were not 
covered beforehand by imperial authority, had played the French a credible and convenient casus 
belli into their hands. The Spanish argued that they had acted under the aegis of the Emperor’s 
jurisdiction, but that was a lie as well as an argument that strengthened France’s posture as the 
defender of the liberties of the German princes. Nevertheless, France needed more in the line of 
just causes to explain its premeditated conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Because its plans 
with the Netherlands were known, the casus belli of Trier, while legally sound, could be 
unmasked for the politically convenient pretext it was. Therefore, France invoked anticipatory 
self-defense against an imminent attack and intervention on behalf of an oppressed people. While 
the latter cause was disputed as a point of law, the former was disputable as a point of fact. For 
its part, Spain only had to justify the Cardinal-Infante’s actions against Trier to turn the war into 
a defensive one. 
 But as stated above, the justice of the war did not turn on the causes but on the goals and 
the necessity of the war. Who had the stronger claim? In fact, Spain had the easier task because it 
wanted nothing but the status quo ante. France for its part wanted to change the balance of power 
in Europe and bring down its enemy. But France too constructed a vision of international order 
that was consistent and promised a lasting and just peace. The French could also find some 
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support with both Gentilis and Grotius, who allowed for a preventive war against a neighbor who 
became too powerful and whose aggressive intentions were clear. But these authors were not 
unbiased, nor was this idea commonly accepted.  
 The truth is that there is no clear answer to the question who had law and justice on his 
side. The war was a war of transition from one international order to another. In this sense, it is 
impossible to judge whose grand strategy was in accordance with the existing order and the law 
of nations that was designed to safeguard it. Spain had the sanction of the past, and France had 
the sanction of the future. Historians and international lawyers have therefore always had a 
tendency to side with France. After all, as Pompey once told Sulla, nobody prefers the dying 
over the rising sun.259
 So shortly after the diplomatic clash between France and the leading power of today 
about the war in Iraq (2003) that rings with reminiscences of the case of 1635, it is hard not to 
give in to the temptation of making some remarks on the relevance of all this for our times. Let 
us do so briefly. First, the law as it is perceived and applied by states can be far different from 
what established doctrine says, even if the wording is the same.  
 Second, there is the notion of ‘hegemonic defense.’ While according to doctrine defense 
was a just cause and was defined as a reaction to an armed attack, thus on the operational level, 
the great powers of 1635 also saw it as a strategic notion. While the traditional right to self-
defense is a natural right that belongs to all, strategic defense is the privilege of – individually or 
collectively – hegemonic powers or powers that aspire to such a position. On the basis of this 
case, we can define ‘hegemonic defense’ as follows. It contains five elements. Primo, a 
hegemonic power, a group of powers that collectively are hegemonic, or a great power or group 
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of powers that wants to prevent another power of becoming hegemonic and itself aspires to that 
position, identifies its own grand strategy with the existing or desired international political and 
legal order.260 This order is considered inherently and undisputedly just. In history, we 
commonly refer to this hegemonic order as Pax Romana, Pax Hispanica, Pax Britannica, Pax 
Sovietica, Pax Americana. Secundo, any attack against the interest of the great power, any 
attempt to prevent the achievement of the great power’s goals is considered an unjust attack 
against that just international order. Tertio, this invites and justifies a defensive reaction. Quarto, 
the ultimate goal and justification of hegemonic defense is the protection of the existing just 
order or the establishing of the justly desired order. Quinto, hegemonic defense is a strong 
platform for arguing preventive war. The enemy’s behavior proves that he wants to disrupt the 
existing order or prevent the desired order of coming into being. It may therefore be better to 
wage a preventive war before he becomes too powerful and achieves his goal. By judging the 
defensive character of a war on the level of goals and grand strategy, the lines between reactive 
and anticipatory war are blurred. 
 Was the appeal to ‘hegemonic defense’ of 1635 an isolated case in modern history? It 
was not. The use of hegemonic defense is a logical complement to the ‘great power principle.’ 
This principle, or ‘legalized hegemony’ as Gerry Simpson recently dubbed it, implies that great 
powers are attributed special factual and legal responsibilities, prerogatives, and rights for the 
formation, functioning, and upholding of the international legal order. During the last three 
centuries, the principle became a central feature of the international legal order, though this was 
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and is often understated in doctrine. During that era, it was condoned, if not acknowledged, that 
the great powers collectively held special responsibilities and rights and executed them by way 
of a directory of great powers. The principle truly came into its own with the Congress of Vienna 
(1815) and lives on today, among others, in the permanent membership of the United Nations 
Security Council. 261 In fact, it was foreshadowed by the guarantee treaties of the eighteenth 
century in which great powers, if not exclusively, took on responsibility for the existing legal and 
political order.262 It is therefore logical to surmise that the institution of ‘hegemonic defense’ 
flourished during the last three centuries. Our own times offer some interesting cases. Gerry 
Simpson considers the recent war in Afghanistan to be an example of how great powers attribute 
themselves special rights in the field of the use of force. One of the arguments brought forward 
to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that the belligerents acted to uphold international law 
when the proper institutions of the international society could not. The same went for NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, though this was done under the name of humanitarian 
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intervention and not on the basis of ‘hegemonic defense.’263 Antony Anghie reaches quite 
similar conclusions about the current ‘war against terror,’ but also makes reference to Kosovo 
and Iraq.264 Case studies for the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries could show how 
frequent this notion of hegemonic defense was used and what it implied at any given time. 
 Third, in a system without a codified law and without an authoritative doctrine, there is 
little to stop the behavior of great powers becoming the law. This should be a warning to 
everyone trying to read too much ius ad bellum outside the UN Charter. I refer to the theses that 
Article 51 of the UN Charter sustained the international customary law of self-defense from 
before 1945,265 or that the Charter did nothing to abolish the allegedly preexisting customary 
right of international humanitarian intervention.266  
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 Fourth, defining the legitimacy of a war in terms of goals is a way to define it in terms of 
political goals. War then returns as an instrument to safeguard the existing or desired 
international order. As long as there is broad consent about this order, this might not cripple the 
law too much. But as the war of 1635 shows, reminiscent as it is to the Cold War or the attempts 
of 2002-2003 by former great powers to challenge the existing order by counterbalancing the 
leading power of the day, in its turn trying unilaterally to impose its view on world order, this 
saps the very foundations of the legal system if consent is withdrawn.  
 Hegemonic defense is, of course, an attempt to divest law of its autonomy and to argue 
politics in legal terms. And it is an old and resilient one. The statesmen of 1635, however,  only 
needed the loophole of traditional doctrine’s insistence on intention and goal to harness the law 
to their endeavor. Article 42 of the UN Charter, which allows military action ‘to maintain or 
restore international peace and security,’ that is in terms of goal, is certainly no improvement 
there. This does not imply that the UN would be any more effective if the law was different, but 
at least the law would give fewer excuses for inaction or political maneuvering. 
 But let us go back in time again, even far beyond 1635. The final word goes to a 
character from one of Tom Holt’s historical novels. Euxenus, the self-acclaimed and cynical 
counterpart of Aristotle as teacher of Alexander the Great, has his own definition of the law. 
‘The law,’ he says, ‘is like a bow. It is designed to be bent almost indefinitely, but never to be 
broken.’267 So, let us not make it all too pliable. 
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